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DECLARATORY RELIEF AFTER MED1MM UNE
by
David ILLevin; and CharlesE. Belle*
In MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., the Supreme Court of the
United States rejected the Federal Circuit's "reasonable apprehension of
imminent suit" test for determining the existence of a justiciable
controversy in actionsfor declaratory relief involving alleged or potential
patent infringement. The Supreme Court substituted the totality-ofcircumstances test, which has long been used trans-substantively in
actions for declaratory relief.Justice Clarence Thomas, the lone dissenter,
contended that the majority's holding would allow parties to seek
improper advisory opinions. This Article evaluates MedImmune 's
impact on declaratory judgment actions in patent litigation and
considers whether justice Thomas 's prediction was accurate. To do so,
this Article compares how the Federal Circuit and other federal courts
addressedjusticiability in patent cases in the three years before and after
the Supreme Court announced its MedImmune decision in January
2007. The Article also examines how lower courts have (and have not)
utilized their discretion to decline to hear actionsfor declaratory relief in
Patent litigation. In sum, MedImmune appears to have had the results
desired by the Court majority: (1) Partiescan more easily demonstrate the
existence of a controversy in order to question arguably coercive measures
by patentees in court; and (2) The lower courts have adhered to a
reasonable notion of when a sufficiently concrete controversy exists, even
though they have not utilized the discretion to decline actions for
declaratory relief as often as they might. justice Thomas's concern that
MedImmune would unleash a torrent of hypothetical actions in and
out of the realm of patent litigation does not appear to be coming to
fr-uition.
1. INTRODUCTION.......................................................
492
MEDIMMUNE AND THE REASONABLE APPREHENSION
OF IMMINENT SUIT TEST...........................................
496
111.
THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS IN MIED MMUNE.....498
A. The Majority Opinion................................................
499
1. Coercion Between PrivateParties:Altvater v. Freeman .... 499
II.

Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. The
authors appreciate the helpful comments made by the participants in the Fall 2009
Business Law Forum at Lewis & Clark Law School. Thanks also to the conference
organizers for affording the opportunity to visit the "Galdpagos Islands," aka the
world of Intellectual Property.
..Editor-in-Chief, Hastings Science & Technology Law journal

491

HeinOnline -- 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 491 2010

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

492

[Vol. 14:2

2. License Agreements Do Not Preclude a Case or Controversy.... 500
B. Justice Thomas's Dissent ..............................
501
1. MedImmune Lacked Standing to Bring Suit
............. 501
2. The Majority Redefined Coercion
.........
............ 502
3. The Majority ImproperlyExpanded the Concept of Coercion.... 504
C. The Court Rejects the ReasonableApprehension Test.................... 505
....... 506
LIFE AFTER MEDIMMUNE
......................
A. The Challenges ofMedImmune...............................
508
1. MedImmune in ClassicPatent Litigation: SanDisk Corp.
v. STMicroelectronics, Inc. .........................
508
a. UnderstandingSanDisk
..................
...... 510
b. Subsequent Cases-ConductAfter SanDisk.................... 511
c. Covenant Not to Sue...........
.................. 513
d. Summary
.............................
...... 515
2. MedImmune and the Abbreviated New DrugApplication
(ANDA)
.................................
..... 515
a. Teva Pharmaceuticals v. Novartis
Pharmaceuticals
..................................
515
b. ComparingTeva 2005 and Teva 2007 ......................... 516
c. Later Cases and the Lower Courts ....
................. 517
3. Conclusion
...............................
...... 518
B. Outcome Assessment ofMedlmmune in the Lower Courts.......... 519
1. Federal Circuit..................................
520
2. District Courts..................................
521
3. Conclusion
...............................
...... 524
C. MedImmune: An Assessment in PatentLitigation....
...... 524
D. MedImmune's Impact Outside ofPatent Litigation................... 525
E. MedImmune and the Discretion to Decline Actions for
DeclaratoryRelief
........................
............. 527
CONCLUSION
...........................................
533

IV.

V.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Every law student learns that the United States Constitution permits
federal courts to hear only "cases ... [or] controversies."' Thus, it has
long been understood that parties cannot obtain opinions on
hypothetical questions from federal courts. Operating on the edge of
this requirement, actions for declaratory relief nevertheless enable courts
to determine the duties, rights, obligations, and status of parties before
any harm has occurred and without making an award of damages to any
party.! Because a declaratory judgment clarifies the relationship between
litigants, it is a useful tool for parties who want to determine the nature

§ 2, cl. 1.
See, e.g., Pelham v. Rose, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 103, 107 (1870).
See, e.g., DAVID I. LEVINE ET AL., REMEDIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 415-40 (5th ed.

' U.S. CONsT. art. III,
2

'
2009).
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of any obligations they may have to one another. More contentious
litigation (and higher stakes, such as punitive damages or criminal
prosecution) may be avoided, abandoned, or settled if the court renders
a declaratoryjudgment that enables the parties to proceed accordingly.
Actions for declaratory relief are particularly common in patent
litigation because of the large costs involved and the potential for
substantial damages. For instance, if a patent owner is aware of a
potential infringer, the patent owner can wait to bring a suit of
infringement while the monetary damages increase, but the (increasingly
liable) potential infringer would have no recourse to rectify the situation.
In this instance, declaratory relief would allow a potential infringer to
determine quickly whether it was in fact infringing on the patent and to
mitigate potential damages. Another common situation is a
manufacturer who would hesitate to make a major investment if it risked
a ruinous infringement suit later. As a result, both licensees and nonlicensees find it useful to seek declaratory relief to protect against
potential suits of infringement by patentees.'
The Supreme Court has returned from time to time to the question
of when parties may seek declaratory relief, while meeting the case or
controversy requirement, ever since it upheld the constitutionality of the

Declaratory judgment Act in 1937.5 Med~mmune, Inc. v. Genentech,

Inc.6 is

one of the latest examples. Med~mmune, which was a closely followed
case, 7 addressed whether ajusticiable controversy existed when the party
'Chief Judge Howard Markey more colorfully described the situation as: "[T]he
sad and saddening scenario that led to enactment of the Declaratory judgment Act.
In the patent version of that scenario, a patent owner engages in a danse macabre,
brandishing a Damoclean threat with a sheathed sword. Guerrilla-like, the patent
owner attempts extra-judicial patent enforcement with scare-the-customer-and-run
tactics that infect the competitive environment of the business community with
uncertainty and insecurity. Before the Act, competitors victimized by that tactic were
rendered helpless and immobile so long as the patent owner refused to grasp the
nettle and sue. After the Act, those competitors were no longer restricted to an in
terrorem choice between the incurrence of a growing potential liability for patent
infringement and abandonment of their enterprises; they could clear the air by suing
for a judgment that would settle the conflict of interests." Arrowhead Indus. Water,
Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 734-35 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
'Federal Declaratory judgment Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-343 (current version
at 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006)); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-40
(1937); Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203, 212 (1937).
6127 S. Ct. 764 (2007).
MedImmune generated substantial attention from court observers, particularly
in the patent law field. Examples of websites and blogs that detailed the Court's
decision and traced its effects in the lower courts ranged from personal blog websites,
e.g., Posting ofJoseph Scott to The Fire of Genius, http://www.thefireofgenius.com/
declaratory-judgment! (Jan. 10, 2007), to websites more dedicated to patent law, e.g.,
Posting of Aaron Barkoff to Orange Book Blog, http://www.orangebookblog.com/
2007/01/supreme-court.r.html (Jan. 9, 2007); Posting of Dennis Crouch to Patently0
Blog,
http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/2006/02/supreme-court.html
(Feb. 22, 2006); Posting of Kevin Noonan to Patent Docs, http://patentdocs.
typepad.com/patent-.docs/2007/01/medimmune-inc..v.html (Jan. 9, 2007). See also
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seeking declaratory relief was a non-repudiating licensee. The Supreme
Court, in an eight-to-one decision written by Justice Antonin Scalia, held
that such a licensee could demonstrate the existence of a controversy8
without repudiating the agreement! In doing so, the Court rejected the
Federal Circuit's "reasonable apprehension of imminent suit" test.1 0o In its
place, the Court substituted an older, and broader, totality-ofcircumstances test,"' which has been used -commonly in actions for
declaratory relief to determine whether a controversy exists.' justice
Clarence Thomas, the lone dissenter, contended that the. ma)3ority's
holding opened the door for parties to seek advisory opinions even
beyond patent litigation because it "contain led] no limiting principle
whatsoever. ,124
This Article evaluates MedImmune's impact on declaratory judgment
actions in patent litigation, and considers whether justice Thomas's
prediction of near-disaster was prescient.'5 To do so, the Article traces the
impact of Med~mmune in conventional patent litigation and in the
regulated procedures under the federal Food and Drug Administration.

Transcript of. Oral Argument, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764
(2007) (No. 05-608), reprinted in 26 BiOTECH L. REP. 155 (2007).
'An action for declaratory relief is, technically speaking, a "controversy," rather
than a "case." Aetna Life Ins. Co., 300 U.S. at 239-40.
'Med~mmune, 127 S. Ct. at 767-77.
'O Id. at 768, 774 ni.1 1. The Federal Circuit originally used the phrase "reasonable
apprehension," hut it evolved into the "reasonable apprehension of imminent suit"
test. Compare, e.g., Jervis B. Webb Co. v. S. Sys., Inc., 742 F.2d 1388, 1398 (Fed. Cir.
1984), with Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1335
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
itMedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 771.
12 See id. at 773 (citing cases).
'Id.
at 777 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 782.
Ju stice Thomas did not remain alone in this view once the decision was
released. For a collection of comments predicting that MedImmune "would 'open the
floodgates' to increased filings of declaratory judgment actions in patent cases," see
Ronald A. Bleeker & Michael V. O'Shaughnessy, One Year After MedImmune-The
impact on Patent Licensing & Negotiation, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 401, 401 & n.2 (2008). See also
Katherine A. Helm & Gene W. Lee, Call It a Comeback: A Sweeping Change in the Law on
DeclaratoryJudgment Actions Against Patent Owners, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. Am. L. 231, 245
(2008) (Med~mmune "kicked open the courthouse door for both licensees and
prospective licensees"); Richard Weil Goldstucker, Note, Sto~p the Bleeding:MedImmune Ends the Unjust~fied Erosion of Patent Holders' Rights in Patent Licensing
Agreements, 16J. INTELL. PROP. L. 137, 139 (2008) ("The Medlmmune decision, on its
face, has left patent holders defenseless. Licensees can negotiate a patent license and
face no risk in challenging the validity of the patent."); Peter Jay, Note, Removing
Incentives for Technology Transfer MedImmune v. Genentech, 5 Burr. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
69, 70 (2007) (MedImmune's "likely result will be a chilling of licensing practices");
Jonathan S. Pope, Comment, DeclaratoiyJudgment Jurisdictionin Patent Disputes: A Rock
and a Hard Place, 9 J. MARSHALL. Rtw. INTELL. PROP. L. 583, 599 (2010) (Medlmmune
"reduces the value of the patent," which "discourages inventors from applying for
patents and potentially decreases the pool of knowledge that the patent system
discloses").
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The analysis addresses whether, under MedImmune- (1) the Federal
Circuit and district courts have begun to grant declaratory relief in cases
stretching the controversy requirement to include far-fetched
circumstances; and (2) whether there has been a rapid increase in
declaratory relief actions. 1
This analysis concludes thatJustice Thomas's critique was accurate in
part. The 17Court's loosening (or, as he contends, its lack) of limiting
principles certainly lowers the burden placed upon the party seeking
declaratory relief-and consequently increases the burden on the
declaratory relief defendant to demonstrate there is no actual
controversy. Before MedImmune, a declaratory relief plaintiff was required
to demonstrate the probability of suit, which was a fairly high hurdle to
overcome. But Med~mmune lowered the hurdle, such that the declaratory
relief plaintiff need only demonstrate the potential for suit. As a result,
there is an increased chance that a court may render an opinion which
proves to be hypothetical. This critique aside, the courts applying
MedImmune so far appear to have managed to adhere to the separation
they must keep between real and hypothetical controversies.
Furthermore, while Med~mmune has spread to areas of law outside of
patent litigation, this outgrowth has been limited. Thus, justice Thomas's
broader critique, that MedImmune would unleash a torrent of
hypothetical actions, does not seem to be coming to fruition.
The Article contains the following parts: Part 11 reviews the facts
surrounding MedImmune and the Federal Circuit's application of the
reasonable apprehension of imminent suit test. Part III summarizes the
majority and dissenting opinions in Med~mmune and examines the
Court's rejection of the Federal Circuit's reasonable apprehension of
imminent suit test in favor of the trans-substantive totality-ofcircumstances test. Part IV assesses "Life after MedImmune." It addresses
how the Federal Circuit and other federal courts have applied the new
test the Supreme Court announced in January 2007 in Med~mmune while
deciding whether to grant declaratory relief both within and beyond
patent litigation. It includes discussion of how lower courts have utilized
the discretion to decline to hear actions for declaratory relief in patent
litigation. Finally, Part V concludes the Article by addressing to what
degree justice Thomas's critique of justice Scalia's majority opinion has
proven to be true. It raises suggestions of how the courts might establish
some limiting principles under the MedImmune regime to maintain an
appropriate burden on the party seeking declaratory relief, in order to be
sure that only true controversies are brought into the judicial arena.
"6 Also relevant is whether the district courts have appropriately exercised the
discretion available to choose not to proceed in an action seeking declaratory relief.
The action for declaratory relief is unusual because, even where an actual controversy
exists and there is jurisdiction over the claim and the parties, the trial court may
decline to hear a declaratory judgment action. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277,
282 (1995). See infra text accompanying notes 245-51.
17Med~mmune, 127 S. Ct. at 782 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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MEFDIMMUNEAND THE REASONABLE APPREHENSION OF
IMMINENT SUIT TEST

The business relationship between MedImmune and Genentech
began harmoniously. The two biotech companies signed a licensing
agreement in 1997 that covered an existing patent and a then-pending
patent application.'8 Genentech's existing patent covered the production
of chimeric antibodies9 and its pending patent related to the coexpression of immunoglobulin chains in recombinant host cells. In
2001, Genentech's pending patent (the co-expression application
"covered by the 1997 license agreement'), "matured into" its Cabilly II
patent. 22 Soon after, Genentech informed MedImmune of its belief that
MedImmune's drug Synagis2 "was covered by the Cabilly II patent and its
expectation that [MedImmune] would pay royalties beginning March 1,
2002 .~2
Disputing Genentech's claim, MedImmune filed a declarato
judgment action that challenged the validity of the Cabilly II patent.
Although it continued to pay all the royalties Genentech claimed under
the license agreement, MedImmune contended that the Cabilly 11 patent
was invalid and that the portion of the agreement referring to "the
coexpression of immunoglobulin chains in recombinant host cells" was

7y

at 767-68 (majority opinion).
A basic medical text explains: "Antibodies are complex glycoproteins (also
called immunoglobulins) that are produced by mature B lymphocytes, circulate in body
fluids, and are secreted on mucosal surfaces. Antibodies specifically recognize and
1Id.

bind to foreign antigens."

HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES Or INTERNAL MEDICINE 750

(Anthony

S. Fauci et al. eds., 17th ed. 2008). A Genentech website defines chimeric antibodies
as "A genetically engineered fusion of parts of a mouse antibody with parts of a
human antibody. Generally, chimeric antibodies contain approximately 33% mouse
protein and 67% human protein. Developed to reduce the HAMA [Human AntiMouse Antibodies] response elicited by murine antibodies, they combine the
specificity of the murine antibody with the efficient human immune system
interaction of a human antibody. However, chimeric antibodies can exhibit a HACA
response (Human Anti-Chimeric Antibodies; similar to H-AMA response) and thereby

may show reduced efficacy as a therapeutic."
GLOSSARY

OF

TERms

(2003),

GENENTECH-,

ANTIBODY TECHNOLOGY:

http://www.gene.com/gene/news/kits/science/

pdf/antibodyglossar-y.pdf.
2HARRISON'S

PRINCIPLES

OF

INTERNAL

MEDICINE,

supra note 19, at 2035

("Immunoglobulins are the products of differentiated B cells and mediate the
humoral arm of the immune response.... All immunoglobulins have the basic
structure of two heavy and two light chains." (paragraph break and citation
omitted)).
21 Med~mmune, 127 S. Ct. at 768.
22Id.
2Synagis
is a medication injected for the prevention of respiratory syncytial virus
disease in high risk infants and children. See RxList, Synagis: Drug Description,
http,//www.r-xlist.com/synagis-drug.htmn ("Indications & Dosage").
14 Med~mmune, 127 S. Ct. at 768.
25 Id.
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unenforceable. Further, MedImmune contended that, in any event,
Synagis did not infringe on the claims covered in the Cabilly 11 patent.1
In support of its contention that a controversy between the parties
had arisen, Medlmmune asserted that Genentech's letter was "a clear
threat to enforce the Cabilly 11 patent, terminate the 1997 license
agreement, and sue for patent infrin ement if [Medlmmune] did not
make royalty payments as demanded."' Medlmmune also contended that
any potential lawsuit launched by Genentech was a substantial threat. If
Genentech succeeded in demonstrating that Synagis infringed on the
Cabilly 11 patent, Medlmmune could be ordered "to pay treble damages
and attorney's fees, and could be enjoined from selling Synagis, a
product that [accounts] for more than 80 percent of its revenue from

sales since

1999.,,29

judge Mariana Pfaelzer of the Central District of

California dismissed the action for declaratory relief for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction because MedImmune did not have a reasonable

apprehension of an imminent

suit.3

1

The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court on appeal .' In
evaluating the circumstances surrounding MedImmune's declaratory
relief action, judge Pauline Newman, writing for the Federal Circuit
panel, applied the court's reasonable apprehension of imminent suit
test.32 The Federal Circuit first articulated the reasonable apprehension
of imminent suit test in BP Chemicals Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp.,33 where it
explained that:
[a party seeking jurisdiction must show that there is] both (1) an
explicit threat or other action by the patentee, which creates a
reasonable apprehension on the part of the declaratory plaintiff
that it will face an infringement suit, and (2) present activity which
could constitute infringement
or concrete steps taken with intent to
3

conduct such

actiVity.

V

This test divides the assessment of the litigants' conduct into two
parts. The first part is an objective analysis of the conduct of the

id.

26
27
21

Id. at 769.
Id. at 768.

29 id.

'Id.; see also MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., No. CV 035-2567 MRP (CmX),
2004 WL 3770589, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2004), affd, 427 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir.
2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 764. The district court relied upon Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc.,
359 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
" Med~mmune, 427 F.3d at 965.
32 Id. at 961, 965.
"4 F.3d 975 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
3Id.

at 978 (citation omitted).

'See, e.g., Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. Civ. 05-2881 JLL,
2005 WL 3619389, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2005), rev'd, 482 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(citing BP Chems. Ltd., 4 F.3d at 978).
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patentee .3 The second part focuses on the conduct of the accused
infringing party."
Applying this test as used in B.P. Chemicals Ltd. and subsequent cases
the Federal Circuit found
such as Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc.3,
Medlmmune failed to demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of suit
had not
because it continued to pay the royalties. 39Genentech
threatened to sue MedImmune, and there had been no "change in
circumstances which affected performance of the contract .... ~ In
concluding, the Federal Circuit stated, "[1] icensor and licensee always
have 'adverse legal interests,' but that relationship alone does not create
a justiciable controversy. The Declaratory judgment Act requires a
'definite and concrete controversy.' 4 1 MedImmune, it concluded, had
not met this requirement.
After the Federal Circuit's ruling, MedImmune sought further
review. The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to decide whether. ... the
'actual controversy' requirement of the Declaratory judgment Act ..
requires a patent licensee to terminate or be in breach of this license
agreement before it can seek a declaratory judgment that the underlying
4
patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed. 1
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS IN MIEDIMMUNE
The Supreme Court overturnied the Federal Circuit in an eight-toone ruling with justice Scalia- writing the majority opinion. 3 In its
opinion, the majority established what it saw as the correct framework for
analyzing declaratory judgment actions in patent litigation. First, the
Court rejected the Federal Circuit's reliance on Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis,
Inc.,"4 in favor of the Court's own opinion in Altvater v. Freeman.5 In so

Med~mmune reflected a common issue between licensees and patentees.
Generally, in patent litigation commenced as an action for declaratory judgment, the
patentee is the defendant because the declaratory relief sought by the plaintiff is
invalidation of a patent in response to alleged patent infringement.
3As

the Federal Circuit put it, "[t]he element of threat or reasonable

apprehension of suit turns on the conduct of the patentee, while the infringement
element depends on the conduct of the asserted infringer." BP Chems., 4 F.3d at 978
(citation omitted).
Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd,
127 S. Ct. 764 (2007).
40 Id.

Id. (citations omitted).
127 S. Ct. at 767.

42Med~mmune,

43 id.
4'

Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Altvater v. Freemnan, 319 U.S. 359 (1943), several patentees sued their

4In

licensees to enforce territorial restrictions in the license. The licensees filed a
counterclaim that the underlying patents were invalid but continued to pay royalties
"under protest." The royalties were required by an injunction that the patentees had
obtained in a prior action. Id. at 360, 365. The Court held "that a licensee's failure to
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doing, the Court expanded the notion of coercion in patent litigation
outside of government actions to private party contracts. Second, the
Court did away with the Federal Circuit's reasonable apprehension of
imminent suit test. justice Scalia's majority opinion found that the
reasonable apprehension of imminent suit test conflicted with the
Court's precedent defining coercion.
A.

The Majority Opinion

Because a declaratory judgment requires a ripe controversy,
MedImmune presented an interesting claim: Does a controversy exist if the
claimant is continuing to pay the agreed-upon royalties, thereby insuring
itself against a suit of (in this case) patent infringement by the
defendant? Thus, a controversy existed only if Medlmmune's continued
payments were the result of coercion, or of a threat of retaliation by
Genentech for failure to pay. justice Scalia's opinion found coercion
could exist because a license agreement does not preclude the existence
481
of a controversy.
1. Coercion Between Private Parties:Altvater v. Freeman
The Court's analysis in MedImmune began by examining coercion in
the context of threatened action by the government. Where threatened
action by the government exists, a plaintiff is not required "to expose
himself to liability before bringing suit to challenge the basis for the
threat. ,49 justice Scalia cited justice Rehnquist's concurrence in Steffel v.
Thompson, 50 stating, "the declaratory judgment procedure is an alternative

to pursuit of the arguably illegal activi ty."'5 Thus, where a plaintiff
"eliminated the imminent threat of harm by simply not doing what he
claimed the right to do ... [t]hat did not preclude subject-matter
jurisdiction because the threat-eliminating behavior was effectively

coerced.

52

Consequently, declaratory relief is rare in situations where the
"plaintiffs self-avoidance of imminent injury is coerced by threatened
cease its payment of royalties did not render nonjusticiable a dispute over the validity
of the patent." Med~mmune, 127 S. Ct. at 773 (citing Altvater, 319 U.S. at 364).
46 See MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 772-73; and id. at 781-82 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
17 Id. at 774 nIlI (majority opinion).
41

Id. at 776.

SId. at 772.
S415 U.S. 452, 478 (1974) (Rehnquist,j., concurring). in Steffel, the local police
threatened to arrest the plaintiff, who sought to distribute handbills against U.S.
involvement in Vietnam on an exterior sidewalk of a shopping mall. The Court held
that the plaintiff had pleaded an actual controversy because the threats of
prosecution were real, and it was unnecessary for the plaintiff to expose himself to
actual arrest in order to make a constitutional challenge. Id. at 459 (majority
opinion).
51MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 772 (quoting Steffe4 415 U.S. at 480 (Rehnquist,
J.,
concurring)).
5' Id. (citations omitted).
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enforcement action of a private party rather than the government. ,1In
such situations, the plaintiffs actions to prevent injury may remove the
ability to demonstrate a controversy; for example, by ceasing to engage in
the disputed behavior. This is not to say, however, that jurisdiction in
such circumstances was non-existent. Lower courts "have long accepted
jurisdiction in such cases,"04 and the best applicable instance in Supreme
Court precedent, Altvater v. Freeman, was "fortuitously, close on its facts"
to Medlmmune's. 5 Justice Scalia's conclusion contrasted sharply with
judge Newman's opinion for the Federal Circuit, which distinguished
Altvater from MedImmune because Altvater "involved the compulsion of an

injunction.,1

6

Rejecting the Federal Circuit's analysis, the Supreme Court found
Altvater could not be distinguished as precedent merely because it
involved the compulsion of an injunction. 57 First, the injunction in
Altvater was "privately obtained" and thus within the "control of the
patentees.,1 8 As a result, the patentees "could permnit its modification. " 5
Second, Altvater "did not say that the coercion dispositive of the case was
governmental, but suggestedjust the opposite."Gw Although "licensees had
the option [to cease payments] . .. the consequence of doing so would
be to risk" treble damages .6 1 And third, the Court in Altvater approvingly
cited a 1913 treatise for the proposition "that an 'actual or threatened
serious injury to business or employment' by a private party can be as
coercive as other forms of coercion. ,2Therefore,
justice Scalia
concluded, coercion can exist where initiatives by a private party threaten
the existence of, or extensive damage to, a business.3
2. License Agreements Do Not Preclude a Case or Controversy
In completing its opinion, the Court dismissed three arguments
raised by Genentech. First, the Court rejected the contention that a
license agreement provides immunity from suits of infringement. 6
Moreover, the Court noted the lack of an explicit prohibition against a
licensee's challenging the validity of patents where "payfing] royalties on

SId. at 773.

54 id.
56

55id.
Compare id. at 774 with MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958, 961

(Fed. Cir. 2005).
51 Med~mmune, 127 S. Ct. at 774.
58 Id.
59Id.
616 Id
6Id.
6Id

omitted).

. (emphasis
(citing FREDERICK

CAMsPBELL WOODWARD, THE LAw

§ 218 (5) (1913)).
0 Id. at 775.
6Id.

at 775-76.
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patents that have not been held invalid does not amount to a promise
6
not to seek a holding of their invalidity. 5
Next, the Court dismissed the contention that a license agreement
precludes a challenge to a patent's validity. justice Scalia agreed with
MedImmune that, "the contract,: properly interpreted, does not prevent
it from challenging the patents.' Moreover, the Court noted that, even
if common law or the license agreement did preclude the suit,
Genentech would "win this case on the merits-not that the very genuine
contract dispute disappears, so that Article III jurisdiction is somehow
defeated .
Finally, the Court declined to simply dismiss the case on
discretionary grounds. 6 Instead, the Court remanded to the district court
for further proceedings "'because facts bearing on the usefulness of the
declaratory judgment remedy, and the fitness of the case for resolution,
are peculiarly within [its] grasp."6 In concluding, the Court reversed the
Federal Circuit and remanded for further proceedings because
MedImmune was not recjvired to breach the license agreement before
seeking declaratory relief.
B. justice Thomas's Dissent
justice Thomas critiqued the Court's ruling as conceptually incorrect
and against the force of precedent. He presented three arguments:
(1) Medlmmune lacked standing because its claim was for a hypothetical
ruling; (2) the Court's rationale improperly extended principles of
coercion to voluntarily entered private contracts; and (3) the lack of an
actual controversy precluded a declaratory judgment. 1
1. Med~mmune Lacked Standing to Bring Suit
justice Thomas began his criticism by asserting that MedImmune's

action was "not a justiciable case or controversy under Article

11.,,12

Medlmmune, justice Thomas argued, was not under a threat of suit by
Genentech because the license agreement had not been breached.
Further, Medlmmune had no cause of action against Genentech because
a claim of patent invalidity is merely an affirmative defense to a patent

65

Id. at 776 (emphasis omitted).

66
67

Id.
id.

"' "The Declaratory judgment Act .. , has long been understood 'to confer on
federal courts unique and substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the
rights of litigants.'" Id. (quoting Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995)).
69
70

Id.

(quoting Wilton, 515 U.S. at 289).

MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 777. On remand, the district court held that under
the Supreme Court's test, it did have jurisdiction over MedImmune's cause of action
for declaratory relief regarding the status of Synagis and the Cabilly II patent.
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
71Med~mmune, 127 S. Ct. at 777 (ThomasJ, dissenting).
"Id. at 779.

HeinOnline -- 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 501 2010

502

502
LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

infringement

suit.7

[Vol.
[o.1: 14:2

Thus, in finding the requisite controversy, the Court

had to import an underlying contract claim that MedImmune had failed
to put forth in its briefs or at oral argument, but had been raised by an
amicus.
justice Scalia responded that justice Thomas's interpretation of
Med~mmune's complaint missed the* underlying contract claim.]7 But
justice Thomas's critique is arguably more narrowly focused on the
failure of MedImmune to state why "sale[s] of its Synagis® product d[o]
not infringe any valid claim of the [Cabilly III patent. 7 6 justice Thomas
77
isolated the problem as the "lack of specificity in the complaint.
MedImmune's contract claim was reducible to a simple argument: "the
patent is invalid and unenforceable .. . [therefore] MedImmune is not

bound by its contractual obligations .,7 Thus, MedImmune's claim was
"independent of any contractual question.",7 9 justice Thomas's conclusion
was simply that the Court should not permit the district court to hear the
action if the contract claim likely would have a minimal effect on the
outcome. In the view ofJustice Thomas, the Court's willingness to import
the contract claim to fabricate an actual controversy was indicative of the
"broad scope" of the ruling."0
2. The Majority Redefined Coercion
justice Thomas next criticized the Court's expanded application of
coercion to "voluntarily accepted contractual obligations between private
pris"'He found the Court's reliance on Altvater to be misplaced and
an erroneous extension of the protection against coercion to contracts
between private parties." Specifically, he noted what he thought were
three pivotal differences between the parties in Altvater and MedImmune.
First, the petitioner in Altvater raised the "affirmative defense of
patent invalidity. ... in a declaratory judg'ment motion filed as a

counterclaim to a patent infringement

suit.",8

In contrast, Med~mmune

Id. at 778.

Id. at 779.

71

'Id.
76

at 770 n.6 (majority opinion).

Id. at 779 (ThomasJ, dissenting) (alterations in original; citation omitted).
77id.

78

id.

79Id.
80Id.

81Id. at 780.
82Id. at 781.
Id. Addressing Altvater's unique facts, justice Thomas noted that, in Altvater,
the patent infringement defendant raised the affirmative defense of invalidity as a
counterclaim and had the burden of demonstrating a case or controversy for a
declaratory judgment. justice Thomas stated: "We specifically held that a finding of
noninfringement on appeal did not moot a counterclaim alleging invalidity. But we
stressed: '[T]he issue before us, therefore[l concern[s] the jurisdiction of an
intermediate appellate court-not the jurisdiction of a trial ...court.. .. In the trial
court, of course, a party seeking a declaratory judgment has the burden of
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84

raised the issue of validity on its own accord . Unlike in Altvater,
MedImmune had not suffered any actual suit, let alone damages. Second,
both the district court and court of appeals in Altvater held "the
,,15
underlying license had been terminated prior to the filing of the case.
Medlmmune, however, desired ajudgment as to whether the patent itself
was invalid. And third, the royalty payments made by the licensee in
Altvater were made under "compulsion of an injunction that had been
entered in a prior case." 86 Here, Genentech was barred from seeking an
injunction because Med~mmune was a non-repudiating licensee.
justice Scalia replied that justice Thomas "incorrectly asserts that
Altvater required actual infringement. 8 ' He faulted justice Thomas's
reliance on a "wildly out of context" quotation concerning "Altvaters
statement that '[~t] o hold a patent valid if it is not infringed is to decide a
hypothetical case."'8 8 justice Scalia contended that the quotation was
simply a means for the Court to distinguish Altvater from another case
"which involved an affirmative defense of patent invalidity that had
become moot in light of a finding of no infringement. "89
justice Thomas, however, did not rely on the quotation from Altvater
to assert a standard. Rather, he contended that Medlmmune could not
bring suit because "a party seeking a declaratory judgment has the
burden of establishing the existence of an actual case or controversy. "90
Thus, he thought that the facts in MedImmune were distinguishable from
Altvater. In Altvater, the Court allowed "a 'licensee' . .. to bring a
declaratory judgment counterclaim asserting the affirmative defense of
patent invalidity in response to a patent infringement suit."91 By contrast,
justice Thomas contended that Medlmmune's claim was hypothetical
because of MedImmune's 92failure
to allege "why" the Cabilly 11 patent
claims were not infringed . By failing to properly place the burden on
Medlmmune, justice Thomas contended that the Court transgressed the
very concern raised in Altvater~ the burden to demonstrate a controversy
93
would shift away from the party seeking the declaratory relief
justice Scalia also disagreed with justice Thomas that Altvaters
unique facts limited the rationale "that payment of royalties under
'coercive' circumstances does not eliminate jurisdiction. 9 Thus, where
establishing the existence of an actual case or controversy.' Id. (alterations in
original) (quoting Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 95 (1993)).
84

id.

85id.
86id.
at 773 n.10 (majority opinion).
Id. (quoting Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 363 (1943)).
'Id. at 774 n.10.
"o Id. at 781 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton
Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83,95 (1993)).
"'Id. at 778.
8Id.

9'Id.

at 779.

Id. at 778-79.
SId. at 774 n.10 (majority opinion).
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justice Thomas relied upon facts he found to be unique to Altvater, such
as the counterclaim against a license agreement already found invalid,
justice Scalia argued that "none of Altvater's 'unique facts,' suggests that a
different test applies to the royalty payments here. 9 5 Indeed, justice
Scalia faulted justice Thomas for "never explain [ing] why the threat of
treble damages and the loss of 80 percent9 6 of petitioner's business does
not fall within Altvater's coercion rationale.
justice Thomas did not address the threat of treble damages directly,
perhaps because he focused on the actual imposition of a monetary cost
in Altvater. Unlike in MedImmune, the licensee in Altvater was bound by an
injunction issued in a prior case to pay patent royalties it claimed it did
not owe 9. Furthermore, in Altvater, there were multiple cases in litigation
and damages accruing against a licensee who could not break out of the
contract because of the injunction. In Med~mmune, there was no such
threat; th'e damages suffered in Altvater were real and persistent, not
conjectured as in MedImmune. justice Thomas feared that MedImmune
raised the specter that in the future, cases of an increasingly far-fetched
nature would be granted declaratory relief."
3. The Majority Improperly Expanded the Concept of Coercion
Finally, justice Thomas contended that the Court improperly
extended the "concept of coercion .. , to ... voluntarily accepted
contractual obligations between private parties." 99 He criticized the Court
for its misapplication of Steffel v. Thompson, which in turn served to
expand the concept of coercion.ln Although Steffel was based on the
coercive nature of governmental power, MedImmune involved two parties
who voluntarily entered contractual obligations. justice Thomas
contended that the concept of coercion in Steffrl "would apply only if
Genentech had threatened Med~mmune with a patent infringement suit
in the absence of a license agreement."'01 Yet MedImmune was under no threat
of suit. Consequently, justice Thomas charged that the Court's ruling
went "far beyond Steffel" 1 2 and removed any "limiting principle
whatsoever" from the definition of a case or controversy.10
justice Scalia countered by claiming the coercion principle he relied
on for the Court did not originate with Steffel, but with Altvater. He
further argued that the threat of treble damages was "every bit as coercive

"Id. (citation omitted).
id.
Id. at 781 (ThomasJ, dissenting).
See id. at 782 ("[T] he majority has given every patent licensee a cause of action
and a free pass around Article III's requirements for challenging the validity of
licensed patents.").
Id. at 780.
Id. at 782 (citing Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974)).
Id. at 782.
102 id.
96

103

Id.
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04
as the modest penalties for misdemeanor trespass threatened in Steffel."
But as justice Thomas noted, Altvater is factually different: there was an
injunction in place from a prior judgment imposing damages. Thus,
absent Altvater, Steffel provides the only basis from which to derive a
concept of coercion. Further, Stefftl can be distinguished because the
coercion stemmed from the government and not from private parties.
The state government's action imposed criminal penalties for actions
protected by the Constitution.'O By contrast, Genentech did not have a
judicially imposed injunction against MedImmune.

C.

The Court Rejects the Reasonable Apprehension Test

Aside from holding that Med~mmune's circumstances supported a
finding that a controversy existed, the Court also abrogated the Federal
Circuit's reasonable apprehension of imminent suit test. In a footnote,
the Court expressly rejected the Federal Circuit's test because it
conflicted with a proper understanding of Altvater. Indeed, the Court
found that even if Altvater could be distinguished because of the
government's injunction, the earlier opinion "still contradict[ed] the
Federal Circuit's 'reasonable apprehension of [imminent] suit' test." 06 In
addition, the Court found the Federal Circuit's test in conflict with
several other leading cases in determining subject matter jurisdiction for
declaratory relief 1 07
justice Thomas did not directly address the footnote. Rather, he
argued that the cases cited by the Court (including Aetna Life, Maryland
Casualty, and Cardinal Chemical) provided "a uniform [constitutional]
framework for assessing whether an Article III case or controversy
exists. 10 8 Consequently, the Court's efforts to apply those cases to
MedImmune's circumstances were inapt. 09
Nevertheless, the demise of the reasonable apprehension of
imminent suit test is probably the most significant holding in MedImmune.
It necessitated the substitution of a different framework of analysis for
'4Id.

at 775 n.12 (majority opinion).

Stefftl, 415 U.S. at 459.
MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 774 n.IlI (citation omitted).
117 Id. at 774-75 & n.11 (citing Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270
(1941)) (finding "jurisdiction obtained even though the collision-victim defendant
could not have sued the declaratoryJudgment plain tiff-insurer without first obtaining
a judgment against the insured"); id. at 774 n.11 (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937)) (finding Jurisdiction obtained even though the very
reason the insurer sought declaratory relief was that the insured had given no
indication that he would file suit"); and id. at 774 n.IlI (citing Cardinal Chem. Co. v.
Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993)) (finding "appellate affirmance of a judgment
of noninfringement, eliminating any apprehension of suit, does not moot a
declaratory judgment counterclaim of patent invalidity").
Med~mmune, 127 S. Ct. at 777 (ThomasJ, dissenting).
Id. at 781 ("Cardinal Chemical... is similarly inapt here. In that case, as in
Altvater, the defendant raised the affirmative defense of patent invalidity in a
counterclaim to a patent infringement suit.").
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declaratory judgment claims in patent litigation. The Supreme Court did
not create one out of whole cloth. Instead, it held that the totality-ofcircumstances test, long used in other declaratory relief actions, should
be applied. 1 0 In doing so, it bolstered the uniform application of the
Declaratory Relief Act by bringing patent litigation back into the transsubstantive fold.''
IV. LIFE AFTER MEDIMMUNE
MedImmune eradicated the hurdles the Federal Circuit had erected
to limit when a controversy existed in an action for declaratory relief.
The Court provided a recycled framework for parties seeking declaratory
relief in patent litigation. The totality-of-circumstances test certainly
broadened the scope of coercive conduct that would suffice as the
predicate for a declaratory relief action. The question remaining was how
much this would open the door to federal court, particularly to would-be
patent challengers who had been unable to enter previously.
justice Thomas contended that the majority in MedImmune went too
far and opened the door completely, which worked to the unfair
detriment of patentees."12 He charged that because the Court's totality-ofcircumstances standard lacked any limiting principles, it allowed parties
to seek hypothetical opinions. As a result, plaintiffs who previously would
have been unable to enter federal court would now be able to
successfully commence declaratory judgment actions. Furthermore,
justice Thomas's concerns extend beyond patent litigation. If he is
correct that MedImmune lacks any limiting factors, that breadth should
make itself felt outside of patent litigation. Therefore, the goal of the
analysis presented in this Part of the Article is to determine whether the
Federal Circuit and district courts have: (1) begun to expand their
reasoning to apply MedImmune to any situation, absent any limiting
factors; and/or (2) significantly increased the granting of declaratory
relief.
To evaluate justice Thomas's critique, the analysis is broken into
several sections examining how the Federal Circuit and lower courts have
applied MedImmune. The first Part examines post-Medlmmune cases
"'"'Basically, the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the
circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having
adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment.'" Id. at 771 (majority opinion) (quoting Md. Gas. Co. v. Pac.
Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).
"'Compare Lorelei Ritchie, Reconciling Contract Doctrine with Intellectual Property
Law: An Interdisciplinary Solution, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 105,
149 (2008) (calling for courts to not treat intellectual property as a discipline kept
separate from other bodies of law), with Helm & Lee, supra note 15, at 232 (observing
that the Court's "significant efforts to realign the patent laws with other non-patent
law jurisprudence .. , has tipped the balance of power away from patent owners and
toward patent challengers").
112 MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 777-82 (ThomasJ, dissenting).
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involving "classic patent litigation."'" 3 The second examines litigation
within the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) regime." 4 These
disputes are framed by federal statutes and regulations. Because the
ANDA regime imposes different procedures and obligations on the
litigants, these decisions can be based on more than the narrow confines
of the parties' conduct. Rather, the judicial opinions are often guided by
procedural obligations imposed by the statutory regime, a distinction
recognized in the opinions.
The analysis then makes a preliminary effort at comparing decisional
outcomes before and after the Supreme Court released MedImmune on
5
January 9, 2007. Three years of judicial opinions following MedImmune"1
6
are compared with a baseline of three years of opinions preceding it." r
The goal is to see whether MedImmune has affected how often actions for
7
declaratory relief are being permitted and when the relief is granted"1
A review of cases following Med~mmune demonstrates that justice
Thomas may well be correct in part. Courts have seemingly shifted the
burden to declaratory relief defendants to try to preclude declaratory
relief. Before MedImmune, the probability of a future suit determined
whether a controversy existed. Med~mmune introduced a lower threshold,
the potential for suit. Yet, even with this shift, the lower courts have
constrained their reasoning and findings in the cases examined.
Foreshadowing the conclusion, justice Thomas's worst fears do not
appear to have been warranted.

...Classic patent litigation is defined here as a dispute based on patent rights
between parties outside of the Federal Drug Administration's regulatory scheme.
' "An Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) contains data which when
submitted to FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Office of Generic
Drugs, provides for the review and ultimate approval of a generic drug product. Once
approved, an applicant may manufacture and market the generic drug product to
provide a safe, effective, low cost alternative to the American public." FDA, U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvs., ABBREVIATED NEW DRUG APPLICATION (ANDA): GENERics
(2009), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDev
elopedandApproved/ApprovaApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDA
Generics/default.htm. See LAWRENCE M. SUNG & JEFF E. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW
HANDBOOK § 5.12, at 435-40 (2008-09 ed. 2008); Ankur N. Patel, Comment, Delayed
Access to Generic Medicine: A Comment on the Hatch-Waxman Act and the "Approval
Bottleneck," 78 FoRDHAm L. REv. 1075 (2009).
":, January 9, 2007 to January 8, 2010.
1January
9, 2004 to January 8, 2007.
117 The Med~mmune opinion has been cited by courts over 300 times. Most of
these citations are not relevant for present purposes. Therefore, the cases examined
for this section of the Article consist of the cases decided in the three-year periods
before and after Med~mmune, which addressed declaratory relief in patent cases and
which were classified as "Examined" or "Discussed" in the Westlaw KeyCite
References for all federal cases. Cases which were classified as "Cited" or "Mentioned"
were excluded from this sample. The KeyCite Reference list was also cross-checked
with search terms that included various combinations of "reasonable apprehension,"
"declaratory judgment," and the main KeyCite, "118A," within the selected
timeframe.
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The Challenges ofMedlmmune

After MedImmune, the Federal Circuit (and the district courts) faced
twin challenges. On one hand, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal
Circuit's reasonable apprehension of imminent suit test because it
conflicted with the Court's view of precedent. 1 1 8 However, the Supreme
Court did not provide a detailed framework in MedImmune to guide lower
courts in their application of the totality-of-circumstances test. The
Federal Circuit addressed this gap almost immediately in two cases:
SanDish Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc. and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.
v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. 1 9 SanDisk provided a framework for
courts to examine the totality of circumstances in the context of classic
patent litigation, while Teva has served as the defining case in the context
of the federal drug application regime.
1. Medlmmune in Classic PatentLitigation: SanDisk Corp. v.
STMicroelectronics, Inc.
In SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., the Federal Circuit had to
decide when a controversy existed given MedImmune's elimination of the
former test's first prong: "whether conduct by the patentee creates a
reasonable apprehension on the part of the declaratory judgment
plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit."2 0 Becaus 'e SanDisk arose
from a common scenario in patent litigation-negotiations over possible
patent infringement in advance of a lawsuit-the Federal Circuit's
opinion provided guidance to assess whether a party's conduct was
sufficiently coercive to justify the other party's seeking declaratory relief
under Med~mmune.
Both SanDisk and ST are manufacturers of flash memory." After a
review of its patent portfolio, ST believed SanDisk was infringing
fourteen of its patents. ST contacted SanDisk to discuss a cross-licensing
agreement. 1 12 The two manufacturers held a meeting where each party

"' MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 774-75 n.11 (2007)
(finding that Altvater contradicted the Federal Circuit's "reasonable apprehension of
imminent suit test" as does Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270 (1941);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937); and Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton
Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993)). See also SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480
F.3d 1372, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("[T~he Court specifically addressed and rejected
our reasonable apprehension test.").
1SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1372; Teva Pharrn. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp.
(Teva 2007), 482 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
'

SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1379; see also Cat Tech, LLC v. TubeMaster, Inc., 528 F.3d

871, 879-80 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (The Federal Circuit addressed the second prong in Cat
Tech, holding that, "although Med~mmune articulated a 'more lenient legal standard'
for the availability of declaratory judgment relief in patent cases," the second prong
of the reasonable apprehension test-the plaintiff must take "concrete steps to
conduct infringing activity"-is still a necessary consideration in a court's assessment
of the totality of the circumstances").
"21SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1374.
122

id.
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presented an analysis of alleged infringement by the other party on their
respective patents. 13While
providing ST's information, its vice president
of intellectual property and licensing allegedly stated, "I know that this is
material that would allow SanDisk to DJ [IST] on ... [ib]ut I have decided
that I will go ahead and give you these materials. 1 2 4 In addition, the ST
vice-president informed the SanDisk representative, "ST has absolutely
no plan whatsoever to sue SanDisk.", 2 5 The licensing talks between the
two parties, however, failed to lead to an agreement. SanDisk filed a
lawsuit in the Northern District of California alleging infringement of
one of its patents and seeking declaratory judgment of non-infringement
and invalidity of the fourteen patents ST had initially contacted SanDisk
1 6
to discuss about cross-licensing.

Because this case initially arose before the Supreme Court's decision
in MedImmune, the Federal Circuit's reasonable apprehension of
imminent suit test applied. judge Jeremy Fogel of the Northern District
of California granted ST's motion to dismiss on the basis that there was
no actual controversy. "SanDisk did not have an objectively reasonable
apprehension of suit, even though it may have subjectively believed that

ST would bring an infringement

suit."' 17

The district court also found

that SanDisk had not provided sufficient evidence to indicate ST
threatened litigation or any other conduct to demonstrate intent "to
initiate an infringement action. 2
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed on the basis of the Supreme
Court's intervening ruling in MedImmune. Writing for the Circuit panel,
judge Richard Linn first found that Med~mmune "represent[ed] a
rejection of [~the] reasonable apprehension of suit test." 2 9 Then, applying
MedImmune, the circuit court found that a controversy might exist where
conduct by the patentee places the "declaratory judgment plaintiff in the
position of either pursuing arguably illegal behavior or abandoning that
which he claims a right to do."'13 The court stated that to evaluate
whether the conduct has forced the plaintiff to seek a declaratory
judgment "depend~s] on. ...the facts and circumstances of each case....
The Federal Circuit found that a controversy existed because: (1) ST
sought a right under its patents based on specific activity by SanDisk; and
(2) ST asserted a right to royalties, which SanDisk disputed. 3 2 Finally,
ST's statement that it did not intend to sue did not obviate a controversy

~"Id. at 1375.
Id. (first alteration in original).
at 1376.
at 1374, 1376.

'~Id.
16Id.

Id. (citing SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. C 04-04379 JF, 2005
WL 5801276 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2005), vacated, 480 F.3d 1372).
"~Id.
at 1376-77.
117

"'Id.
"'Id.

at 1380.
at 1381.

"'Id.
"'Id.

at 1382.
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"because ST ha[d] engaged in a course of conduct that showlied] a
preparedne Iss and willingness to enforce its patent rights despite [the]
a.

UnderstandingSanDisk

Although it is consistent with MedImmune, SanDisk nevertheless
confirms justice Thomas's point that the Supreme Court did not provide
any limiting factors for when parties could seek declaratory relief. As
judge William Bryson noted in a concurrence, MedImmune compelled the
circuit court's holding. However, he also "[saw] no practical stopping
point short of allowing declaratory judgment actions in virtually any case
in which the recipient of an invitation to take a patent license elects to
dispute the need for a license and then to sue the patentee . 3 In effect,
judge Bryson reiterated justice Thomas's concern that the lack of
limiting principles would allow for hypothetical opinions in other cases
in the future.
In addition, SanDisk illustrates the Federal Circuit's compelled
abandonment of the principles underlying the reasonable apprehension
of imminent suit test. Although ST sought to alleviate the threat of suit,
the Federal Circuit found its actions occurred too late, after a*threat had
been established.' In so doing, the court focused on the timing of ST's
conduct (i.e., whether the patentee made any claim of infringement);
and, who was involved in the negotiations (e.g., lawyers or engineers).
This analysis contrasts starkly with the Federal Circuit's reasonable
apprehension of imminent suit test, which took into account ST's
conduct in exposing itself to a declaratory judgment action (and thereby
decreasing its own ability to succeed in an infringement suit).
Finally, besides altering the framework for determining an imminent
threat, SanDisk also illustrates the lowered threshold a declaratory relief
plaintiff needs to meet to demonstrate a controversy. 16Almost
any
conduct might now be considered "threatening" given the totality of the
circumstances. The court's reasoning in SanDisk, however, raised three
additional questions. One, by merely asserting a claim of infringement, is
a patentee necessarily exposed to a declaratory judgment action? Two,
can a patentee take actions to insulate its claim of infringement from a

at 1383.
at 1385 (Bryson,J., concurring in result).
"5
Factors cited by the court include: ST approaching SanDisk after having made
a determination of infringement; ST's communication of its determination to
SanDisk of infringement; and, only then stating, "it does not to intend to sue." Id. at
1383 (panel opinion). SanDisk is discussed in Patrick R. Colsher, Comment, SanDisk
Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 53 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 351 (2008); Greg Halsey,
Comment, There is a Pink Elephant at Our Patent Negotiation, and His Name is Declaratory
Judgment, 46 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 247 (2009).
"See Micron Tech., Inc. v. MOSAID Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d 897, 902 (Fed. Cir.
2008) ("Whether intended or not, the now more lenient legal standard facilitates or
enhances the availability of declar-atory judgment jurisdiction in patent cases."
(citations omitted)).
'~Id.
''Id.
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declaratory judgment action? And three, when is the proper time for a
patentee to communicate that it does not plan on filing an action on its
own behalP Subsequent cases provide some insight into the path the
Federal Circuit has taken to answer these questions.
b. Subsequent Cases-ConductAfter SanDisk
The Federal Circuit explored the bounds of unacceptable conduct in
Sony Electronics, Inc. v. Guardian Media Technologies, Inc. 17Sony
Electronics,
represents a "returning" case, i.e., one that had been decided previously
under the reasonable apprehension of suit test, but was reviewed after
the decision in MedImmune.'9 8 The district court had dismissed the
declaratory relief action before Med~mmune was decided because the
patentee had not expressly threatened to sue the plaintiff for patent
infringement and none of the patentee's actions "amounted to an

implicit threat of immediate litigation."'3 9

The

Federal Circuit reversed on
0
4

the basis of the intervening MedImmune decision.
In Sony Electronics, Guardian claimed that Sony's use, among other
firms, of the V-Chip technology in its television and DVD products
infringed on Guardian's patents. 41After
negotiations between the two
companies failed, Sony filed an action for declaratory relief, challenging
4
the validity of Guardian's patents. 1
judge Sharon Prost, writing for the circuit panel, focused on the
patentee's conduct to determine whether there was a controversy.
Drawing on SanDisk, the circuit court rested its finding of subject matter
jurisdiction in Sony Electronics on two points. One, prior to Sony filing its
complaint, the parties adopted adverse positions. judge Prost cited
Guardian's detailed infringement analyses and "position ... [that the
patents] were valid and infringed by Sony and that Guardian was
therefore entitled to past and future royalties based on that
infringement.' 4 3 And two, Sony's claim was not a request for a merely
hypothetical opinion because Guardian had "explicitly identified the

patents" in question.14
Like SanDisk, Sony Electronics demonstrates what the Federal Circuit
later observed as the "ease of achieving declaratory)udgment jurisdiction
in patent cases" as a result of MedImmune's holding. "While
failing under
"'Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Teclis., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir.

2007).
Id. at 1283.
at 1281 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
at 1283, 1285.
...Id. at 1273-74.
142 Id. at 1276.
Id. at 1285.
"~Id.
'~Id.

Id.

Tech., Inc. v. MOSAID Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d 897. 902 (Fed. Cir.
2008). See also Jennifer R. Saionz, Note, DeclaratoryJudgment Actions in Patent Cases: The
Federal Circuit's Response to MedImmune v. Genentech, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161
(2008).
15Micron
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the reasonable apprehension of imminent suit test, 16 Guardian's conduct
easily surpassed the "controversy" threshold under MedImmune. Guardian
sent letters with the option for parties to pay a lump sum payment to
acquire a "paid up license;" it asserted patent infringement against
several companies all for the exact same patent; it made public assertions
it sent Sony a
of its intent to enforce its patents through litigation;1 4and
7
letter stating its failure to respond was "unacceptable.
District court decisions have reflected SanDisk's lowered threshold
for establishing a controversy. The courts' recognition of the lower
threshold, however, was evident even before SanDisk was decided. For
instance, in two cases published on the same day, two district courts
applied reasoning mirroring what became the Federal Circuit's
interpretation of MedImmune's lowered threshold just a few weeks later in
SanDisk. In Rite-Hite Corp. v. Delta T Corp.,14 a magistrate judge in the
Eastern District of Wisconsin found that a licensee's acts constituted the
basis for a controversy because the acts gave notice of the licensee's
149
intent to terminate a license agreement (pursuant to the contract) .
The licensee believed the patent was invalid and intended to launch a
competing product. 5 0 Similarly, in Highway Equipment Co., Inc. v. Cives
Corp., Chief judge Linda Reade of the Northern District of Iowa found
that the patentee's conduct was indicative of a controversy under
MedImmune because the patentee failed to promise that it would not sue."
The district courts applying SanDisk as direct precedent have, not
surprisingly, continued to apply a lowered threshold for declaratory relief
plaintiffs to demonstrate the existence of a controversy. Two examples
highlight the courts' willingness to interpret a- threat broadly, including
indirect actions taken by a patentee. A third example illustrates the outer
limits of the new test.
In WS Packaging Group, Inc. v. Global Commerce Group, LLC,15 2 no
specific threat was made, yet the district court found that a declaratory
judgment action was justified. The patentee's "bragg~ing] in a trade
magazine of its habit of threatening to sue ...the customers of allegedly
infringing vendors or manufacturers" was a means of pressuring
parties. 5 3 Similarly, in EchoStar Satellite LLC v. Finisar Corp., the district
court found the SanDisk "standard allows a finding of an actual
controversy in circumstances where the party seeking declaratory
judgment has reason to believe that further negotiations will be
14' Sony Elecs., Inc., 497 F.3d at 1288 (district court finding "even if some of
Guardian's language can be construed as implied threats, the overall tone ... was one
of discussion and negotiation" (citation omitted)).
''Id.
at 1275.
''No. 06-C-1 187, 2007 WL 725327 (E.D.Wis. Mar. 7, 2007).
Id. at *7.
'~Id. at *8.
..
476 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1082, 1086 (N.D. Iowa 2007).
505 F. Supp. 2d 561 (E.D. Wis. 2007).
Id. at 565-66.
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fruitless. 1 14 Therefore, the court concluded, a patentee's successful
infringement suit against a third party and a press statement stating "its
intention to continue ongoing licensing discussions with other
companies" was sufficient to demonstrate a threat.15
Where a district court has not found a controversy under the
standard announced in SanDisk, the link claimed between the patentee
and the declaratory relief defendant was deemed to be too tenuous. For

example, in seg~ne, Inc. v. Fox Broadcasting

Co.,15

segOne brought an

action for declaratory relief based on Fox's alleged coercion. The action
contended that Fox's successful copyright infringement suit filed against
one of segOne's customers,' 57 who used segOne's technology while
violating copyright laws, was coercive.15 The court dismissed the suit,
however, because Fox's suit did not coerce segOne customers into
"complying with Fox's demands," but only to stop infringing on Fox's

copyrighted maeil

5

The seg~ne case, however, can be distinguished from WS Packaging
and EchoStar. Fox was not contesting the validity of segOne's patent,
merely a customer's allegedly improper use of the patented device.
Unlike in Med~mmune, there was no real potential for a suit about alleged
infringement or validity of the patent or the patented product. 1"By
contrast, in WS Packaging and EchoStar, the courts found the mere
potential for a future lawsuit alleging infringement to be sufficient to
establish the basis for a controversy.
c. Covenant Not to Sue
Despite the new lower threshold, the Federal Circuit has recognized
that a covenant not to sue can insulate a party from a declaratory relief
suit. In Benitec Australia, Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc.,
the district court
dismissed Nucleonics' suit for declaratory relief because Benitec offered
Nucleonics a covenant not to sue after commencement of the

154

EchoStar Satellite LLC v. Finisar Corp., 515 F. Supp. 2d 447, 451 (D. Del.

2007).
Id. at 451-52 (emphasis added).
3:07-CV-342, 2007 WL 2965064 (E.D. Va. Oct. 9, 2007).
1Id.
at *I. SegOne produced a device that enabled specific content to be
delivered through the television to targeted groups of consumers by piggybacking on
the signals of television broadcasters. Id. Fox Broadcasting successfully sued one of
segOne's customers, Flying J, for copyright infringement stemming from the public
performance of copyrighted material without authorization. Although segOne was
not a party to the suit, "the parties settled the [dispute] using money provided by
segOne's insurer." Id. Moreover, Flying J was required to "stop using segOne's
device." Id. As a result, segOne ceased to distribute the device in the U.S.
...Id. at *3.
SId.
at *2.
Compare with Cordance Corp. v. Amazoncom, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 340. 345
(D. Del. 2007) (finding controversy where the party provided technical assistance and
developed "the architecture by which other companies are able to allegedly infringe
Amazon's patent").
"6' 495 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2055 (2008).
16No.
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litigation. 1 6 ' Nucleonics appealed, but the Federal Circuit affirmed the
lower court's dismissal on the basis of the intervening MedImmune

decision.

163

The Federal Circuit panel majority distinguished Benitec from
SanDisk because Benitec offered a covenant not to sue after determining
it did not have a case for infringement against Nucleonics. 6 4 The Benitec
court noted that ST's statements that it would not sue in SanDisk had
come in the course of negotiations in which ST had never disavowed any
intent to sue SanDisk in the future. In contrast, Benitec's actions
effectively made a covenant not to sue, and it "sought dismissal of its
infringement claim after it concluded that [federal regulatory rules]
precluded an infringement claim based upon the activities of
Nucleonics., 6 1 Consequently, Benitec's offer did not place Nucleonics in
a forced position to accept or face legal action. The regulatory statutes
precluded an infringement claim even without the covenant not to sue."
The Benitec case illustrates how a party, without a prior agreement,
might insulate its patents from any action for declaratory relief: simply
offer a covenant not to sue. Ben itec, however, raises an additional
question: Would an action for declaratory relief have been granted
absent the overriding context of the federal regulations? 6
Benitec's particular circumstances aside, district courts have adhered
to the Federal Circuit's preclusion of declaratory relief because of an
offer of a covenant not to sue. But the district courts have read Benitec
narrowly. For instance, in Furminator, Inc. v. Ontel Products Corp., the
district court followed Benitec explicitly while dismissing a counterclaim
for declaratory relief after the patent holder dismissed its infringement
claims and granted a covenant not to sue. 18By contrast, in FieldTurf USA,
Inc. v. Sports Construction Group, LLC, the district court, invoking Benitec,
found a controversy existed because the patentee's covenant not to sue

at 1347-48.
at 1349.
'~Id. at 1347. judge Timothy Dyk dissented because he believed that the court
should analyze the jurisdictional, question a little differently when the infringement
claim was withdrawn after the commencement of litigation. But he also said that he
would have agreed with the majority if the covenant not to sue had been offered
before the action for declaratory relief had been filed. Id. at 1350 (Dyk, J.,
dissenting).
'Id. at 1347 (panel opinion).
66 Id. at 1346-47.
"'See, e.g., Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc., 556 F.3d 1294, 1298,
1300 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (reversing denial of declaratory relief action and distinguishing
Benitec because of differences in scope of covenant not to sue); Edo Royker, Note,
Covenants Not to Sue Provide Less Immunity in a Post-Medlmmune World, 61 H-AsTiNGS
L.J. 473 (2009) (reviewing different situations involving covenants not to sue under
the Federal Circuit precedents).
'6' Furminator, Inc. v. Ontel Products Corp., 246 F.R.D. 579, 590 (E.D. Mo.
2007).
12Id.
63Id.
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was not unconditional. 69 In FieldTurf, the court found the "narrow
promise not to sue and the resulting estoppel do not preclude plaintiffs
offers for sale,. ...and
from re-filing suit with respect to defendant's
7
[installation of its product at otlier] locations.' 1
d. Summary
Med~mmune changed how lower courts evaluate the threat of suit
from whether there is a probability of suit to whether a potential for suit
exists. Under the now-discarded reasonable apprehension of imminent
suit test, the lower courts looked for whether any express threats to sue
were made. By contrast, courts now examine whether a potential suit
might arise in the future. Thus, a controversy might be found in indirect
threats made through third parties (e.g., WS Packaging) or even subjective
feelings of threatening circumstances (e.g., EchoStar). The courts do
impose some limitations; for example, in Benitec, the patentee offered a
covenant not to sue, which eliminated any potential for suit. These
limitations appear to arise out of the context of statutory regulations. In
fact, statutory regulations in the ANDA regime serve as a limiting
framework, which is explored in the next Part.
2. MedImmune and the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA)
Following on the heels of SanDisk, the Federal Circuit released Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (Teva 2007)."17
Unlike in SanDisk, however, the disputants in Teva 2007 were operating
within the Federal Drug Administration's ANDA regime.7 Accordingly,
federal regulatory powers imposed a framework on the Federal Circuit's
analysis of coercive conduct and the potential for suit.
a. Teva Pharmaceuticals v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals
In 2005, Teva Pharmaceuticals, a generic drug manufacturer, filed
an ANDA based on five patents protecting Novartis' drug Famciclovir.17
Novartis responded by filing a patent infringement suit, a standard
procedure by a patent holder under the ANDA regime. Novartis,
however, claimed infringement on only one of the five threatened
so doing, Novartis left open the possibility of a lawsuit under
patents. 14In
"'FieldTurf USA, Inc. v. Sports Construction Group, LLC, 507 F. Supp. 2d 801,
808 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
170

id.

Teva 2007, 482 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1334. See supra note 114. Firms file ANDAs with the Federal Drug
Administration for the review and ultimate approval of generic drugs. The Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 provides that a filing of a
Paragraph IV certification with respect to a drug claimed by an existing patent, which
may be included in an ANDA, constitutes an act of patent infringement. 35 U.S.C.
§ 271 (e) (2) (2006).
1'Teva
Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp. (Teva 2005), No. Civ. 05-2881
ILL, 2005 WL 3619389, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2005); rev'd, 482 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
171
172

174

id.
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the four remaining patents. 7 5 In turn, Teva filed an action for declaratory
171
relief concerning those four patents.
The district court in New Jersey dismissed Teva's declaratory
judgment action for lack of a controversy. 17 7 In rejecting Teva's action
against Novartis in Teva 2005, the district court relied on the Federal
Circuit's holding in yet another case involving Teva. 7 1 In Teva/Pfizer, the
Federal Circuit had dismissed an action for declaratory judgment relief
that Teva had filed against Pfizer because Teva could not demonstrate a

reasonable apprehension of imminent

surit.

1 79

Following the Supreme Court's holding in Med~mmune, however,
Teva sought to revive its action against Novartis in Teva 2007.
Resubmitting its appeal to the Federal Circuit, Teva requested a
declarato~yjudgment with respect to the four therapeutic patents held by
Novartis.1 8 The Federal Circuit, now applying Med~mmune, discarded its
reasonable apprehension of imminent suit test. Examining the totality of
the circumstances, the circuit court found Novartis had in fact created a
controversy by threatening Teva's approval of Teva's ANDA.' 8 ' Novartis,
by claiming even a single act of infringement, "plac[ed] into actual
dispute the soundness of Teva's ANDA and Teva's ability to secure
approval of the ANDA."'
Although Novartis had not expressly
threatened to sue Teva for infringement of the other four patents, the
court found the "threat of litigation is a present injury creating a
justicable controversy [because the] statutory window does not preclude
Novartis from pursing additional infringement suits under 35 U.S.C. §
271 (e) (2) (A) . 8 Put simply, a controversy exists because of the potential
that a lawsuit could be initiated in the future based on Novartis's four
therapeutic patents, which Teva listed in its federally required ANDA.
b. Compaing Teva 2005 and Teva 2007
The circuit court's analysis in Teva 2007 sharply diverged from the
district court's in Teva 2005. In Teva 2005, the district court applied the
Federal Circuit's reasonable apprehension of imminent suit test and
dismissed Teva's action for declaratory relief. 8 4 By contrast, in Teva 2007,
the Federal Circuit found that even though "several of Teva's grounds
alleging an 'actual controversy' when standing alone might not be
sufficient, if taken as a whole these circumstances establish a justicable
"75

176

id.
id.

at *4.
Id. at *2 (citing Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. (TevaPfzer), 395 F.3d
1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Teva/Pfizer concluded several months before Teva 2005 was
17Id.

17'

decided.
179 id.

Teva 2007, 482 F.3d at 1330, 1334.
11Id.

182

at 1340.

id.

85Id.

at 1341.

Teva 2005, 2005 WL 3619389, at *4.
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Teva 2005 and Teva 2007
5' Two key differences between
illustrate the changes that MedImmune made in the analytical framework.
First, the circuit court changed the threshold of analysis. In Teva
2005, the district court focused on the probability of future litigation, or
lack thereof, under the compulsion of the Federal Circuit's reasonable
apprehension of imminent suit test.18 6 In contrast, the Federal Circuit in
Teva 2007 shifted the emphasis to the potentialfor future litigation in the
wake of MedImmune. A controversy existed in 2007 because Novartis had
insulated its patents from suit by withholding some potential suits of its
own, but still held the potential of suing later. 11
Second, the circuit court changed its framework for analysis with
respect to federal regulations. Although neither the facts nor the
applicable regulations had changed between Teva 2005 and Teva 2007,
the courts employed the regulations differently. In Teva 2005, patent
filing was a statutory requirement; an objective standard was used to
assess the patentee's intentions." Applying MedImmune in Teva 2007,
however, the Federal Circuit cited the ability of Novartis to sue Teva
under 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e) (2) (A) as evidence of a threat and therefore the
existence of a controversy. 89 Thus, the statutory regulations-previously
used to make an objective assessment-now became instrumental in
identifying an implicit threat without any additional facts or
circumstances surrounding a patentee's intentions.
c. Later Cases and the Lower Courts
Other examples illustrate how ANDA regulations have constrained
the courts' interpretation of Med~mmune in that context. For instance, in
Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Forest Laboratories, Inc. ,'" the
patentee, Forest Laboratories, filed a motion to dismiss Caraco's
declaratory judgment action for patent invalidity because Forest
Laboratories offered a covenant not to sue after being served.' 9 ' The
Federal Circuit, however, held that a controversy existed, despite the
covenant. 1 192 The panel majority, judges Arthur Gajarsa and Sharon Prost,
dismissed the covenant because their court's "singular approach to the
15Teva

2007, 482 F.3d at 1341.

...Id. at 1335.
"' Id. at 1345.

'8Teva Pharmn. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. (Teva/Pfizer), 395 F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (citing Capo, Inc. v. Dioptics Med. Prods., 387 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2004) ('The standard is objective, and focuses on whether the patentee manifested
the intention to enforce the patent, and would be reasonably expected to enforce the
patent against the declaratory plaintiff.")).
18'
Teva 2007, 482 F.3d at 1340. "While it is true that the suit on the '937 patent is
a different 'case' than Teva's declaratory judgment action, Novartis created a present
and actual 'controversy' by choosing to sue under 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e) (2) (A) on Teva's
single act of infringement, thereby placing into actual dispute the soundness of
Teva's ANDA and Teva's ability to secure approval of the ANDA." Id.
527 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1316 (2009).
Id. at 1282.
12Id.

at 1297.
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justicability of declaratory judgment actions was struck down by the
Supreme Court in MedImmune." r3The
circuit court noted that a covenant
not to sue would have precluded a declaratory judgment action under
the reasonable apprehension of suit test "because [Caraco] would no
longer have a reasonable apprehension of [imminent] suit by the
patentee.' 9 4 Consistent with Benitec, the Federal Circuit recognized in
Caraco that the existence of a covenant not to sue was no longer
determinative; rather, the totality of the circumstances, per MedImmune,
95

had to be evaluated.

Several other lower court decisions have followed Teva 2007's
operative constraints within the ANDA regime. For example, in SB
Pharmco Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co.,'9 the district court
faced the question of whether a case or controversy existed when the
ANDA procedures were not propely followed. Ini this case, Mutual
Pharmaceutical sought declaratory judgment following its submission of
an ANDA. "n'SB Pharmco, the patentee, however, challenged the action
for declaratory relief, contending that no controversy existed because
Mutual sent its notice letter prematurely pursuant to the FDA's
regulations for ANDA. Citing Teva 2007, the court examined whether "an
injury-in-fact ... can be redressed by the court.' 9 8 Finding for the
patentee, the court dismissed the declaratory judgment action, holding
that there was no controversy at the time the plaintiffs filed their
complaint, because the ANDA "could not have been approved by the
FDA" and the "Defendants' ANDA could not cause an injury-in-fact to
Plaintiffs. "'99
3. Conclusion
SanDisk well illustrates an expansive notion of controversy. Where
the reasonable apprehension of imminent suit test would have precluded
a controversy, MedImmune lowers the bar. This lowered threshold allows
parties to engage in conduct that might be an attenuated controversy,
but is still sufficient to initiate an action challenging the validity of a
patent.
The expanded notion of controversy, however, is held somewhat in
check through two mechanisms. First, it does not appear that either the
Federal Circuit or the district courts have granted declaratory relief in
far-fetched circumstances in the wake of MedImmune. In fact, they seem to
have adhered to a narrow focus on the circumstances of each case. One
example is FieldTurf USA, where the district court found a sufficient

"'Id.at 1294 n.13.
194 id.

"Judge Daniel Friedman thought that the basis for the claim was too
speculative and dissented on that basis. Id. at 1297-98 (Friedman,j., dissenting).
"6s552 F. Supp. 2d 500 (E.D. Pa. 2008).
SId.
at 504-05.
Id. at 512.
19 Id.
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controversy because the covenant not to sue was not unconditional .
Where the courts have begun to develop some habits of potential
concern is the seeming shift in burden from the declaratory relief
plaintiff to the defendant.
Second, the ANDA regime imposes procedural elements where it
applies, which establish a minimum threshold to demonstrate
controversy outside of the totality of circumstances. Consequently, a
party's failure to follow ANDA procedures would likely preclude a
declaratory judgment action under either the reasonable apprehension
of imminent suit test or Med~mmune's totality-of-circumstances test. A
good example of this is SB Pharmco's failure to submit its ANDA
materials by the deadline." As the court noted in SB Pharmco, ANDA
filings impose a host of procedural mechanisms, which. are designed in
202
part to mitigate unnecessary patent litigation.
Therefore, based on the cases discussed so far, it appears thatJustice
Thomas was partially correct, but probably overly concerned, about the
potentially widespread effects of Med~mmune. Although MedImmune
removed the firm limiting principles that the Federal Circuit had
previously applied when determining the existence of a controversy in
patent litigation, even this shift has been mitigated somewhat, such as
when those disputes fall under federal regulations via the ANDA regime.
B.

Outcome Assessment ofMedlmmune in the Lower Courts

In addition to seeking to determine how Med~mmune might affect the
availability of declaratory relief, this Article also tries to determine
whether there were any major changes in the rate of decisional
outcomes. This Part shows the results of comparing declaratory relief
actions decided in the three years preceding Med~mmune with the three
years immediately following. There are forty and fifty-two cases,
203
respectively, in these two categories. Also, after separating the decisions
into those decided by the Federal Circuit and those decided by district
courts, the cases were further categorized by: (1) the type of party
seeking the declaratory judgment, e.g., patentee, non-licensee, or
licensee; and (2) the outcome, i.e., whether a declaratory judgment was
granted or not.

200

Fieldurf USA, Inc. v. Sports Constr. Group, LLC, 507 F. Supp. 2d 801, 808

(N.D. Ohio 2007).
20' SB Pharmco Puerto Rico Inc., 552 F. Supp. 2d at 512.
202 Id. at 508.
203 Some cases were excluded because they were not rulings by the Federal
Circuit, but by other circuits. E.g., Wis. Ctr., Ltd. v. Shannon, 539 F.3d 751 (7th Cir.
2008); Metrologic Instruments, Inc. v. Symbol Tech., Inc., 254 F. App'x 128 (3d Cir.

2007). Other cases were not included because other factors necessitated their
exclusion. E.g., Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (C.D. Cal.
2008) (on remand); Dow Chem. Co. v. Reinhard, No. 07-12012-BC, 2007 WI. 5361218
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 20, 2007) (not patent litigation).
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Overall, it appears that the lower courts have implicitly heeded
justice Thomas's concern about the lack of limiting factors in
MedImmune .2 0 4 The post-Medlmmune decisions appear fairly consistent
with the pre-Medo-mune outcomes. The totality-of-circumstances test has
not actually gone unchecked. Even before Med~mmune, the Federal
Circuit generally found subject matter jurisdiction to exist because it
thought that there was a sufficient controversy under the reasonable
apprehension of imminent suit test. It does not appear that the rate of
finding subject matter jurisdiction has gone up greatly after Med~mmune
lowered the threshold. This implies a certain consistency in the Federal
Circuit's reasoning because, even with MedImmune's lowered threshold,
the circuit court has not dramatically changed in its rate of
determination of when a controversy exists.
MedImmune did create a category of litigants bringing "returning
cases." These parties sought to use Med~mmune to reassert previously
unsuccessful claims for declaratory relief. These returning cases,
however, are small in number and a temporary phenomenon by their
nature. They do not seem to presage a large upswelling of actions for
declaratory relief.
1. Federal Circuit
Despite the fact that its former test was rejected as being too hard to
meet, the Federal Circuit's post-Medlmmune decisions ar 'e generally
consistent with its pre-Medlmmune decisions. Where a party has sought
declaratory relief, the Federal Circuit has not dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction when it has found that a controversy actually existed.
A comparison of court decisions before and after Med~mmune, however,
does illustrate some slight changes in the type of party seeking
declaratory relief.
For instance, the Federal Circuit has ruled fairly consistently (but not
totally) in favor of non-licensees seeking declaratory relief. In the three
years prior to MedImmune, the Federal Circuit granted declaratory relief
in three out of the four instances in which it was sought.20 5 In the three
years after Med~mmune, although the Federal Circuit had a few more cases
per year, it granted declaratory relief in five out of the seven cases in
which it was sought. 206 The differences may simply reflect some non2"' These conclusions are necessarily tentative because the different categories
are not statistically significant from one another.
2'Subject
matter jurisdiction found in: Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, 394 F.3d
1341 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Sierra Applied Scis., Inc. v. Advanced Energy Indus., Inc., 363
F..3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Capo, Inc. v. Dioptics Med. Prods., Inc., 387 F.3d 1352
(Fed. Cir. 2004). Subject matter jurisdiction denied in: Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v.
Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
.Subject matter jurisdiction found in: Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex
Eyewear, Inc., 556 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Cat Tech, LLC v. TubeMaster, Inc., 528
F.3d 871 (Fed. Cir. 2008); SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372
(Fed. Cir. 2007); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330
(Fed. Cir. 2007); Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271
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licensees seeking to push the new and uncertain looser limits on actions
for declaratory judgment relief. However, due to the limited number of
cases, no firm conclusions can be drawn. Moreover, the Federal Circuit's
willingness to deny declaratory relief in some cases, despite the rebuke it
received in MedImmune, indicates that some limiting principles do exist in
the totality-of-circumstances formula.
One small difference is that, since Med~mmune, the number of
licensees versus patentees initiating the action for declaratory relief has
reversed. Before MedImmune, there were two instances of licensees
seeking a declaratory judgment, and one suit by a patentee. Where
licensees did seek declaratory relief, the circuit court split, finding a
sufficient controversy and therefore subject matter jurisdiction in one
instance but not the other. 0 7
By contrast, after Med !mmune, licensees have not appealed any
declaratory relief actions to the Federal Circuit, but one patentee has
sought declaratory relief.21 In that instance, however, the patentee was
operating within the ANDA regime. Because there are so few cases, it is
not possible to draw conclusions with any confidence. The paucity of
cases, however, may reflect a change in negotiation strategy by licensors
because licensees clearly have more ability to challenge the validity of
patents. Finally, where the ANDA regime was invoked, the Federal
Circuit's post-Medlmmune decisions overturned the district courts and
found subject matterjurisdiction in both instances. 209
2. District Courts
District courts generated more holdings than the Federal Circuit.
Many regional circuits have had at least one district court case, both
before and after MedImmune's decision during the evaluated time period.
Of these cases, the type of parties seeking declaratory relief, i.e., mostly
non-licensees, has remained constant.
Broadly speaking, a comparison of district court decisions before
and after MedImmune was decided demonstrates the lower courts'
consistency. Subject matter jurisdiction was found at a somewhat higher
rate after Med~mmune. In the three years before MedImmune, district
courts found subject matter jurisdiction in 5 of 26 contested cases

(Fed. Cir. 2007). Subject matter jurisdiction denied in: Benitec Austi., Ltd. v.
Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007), crt, denied, 128 S. Ct. 2055 (2008);
Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

207 MedImmune, Inc. v. Centocor, Inc., 409 F.3d
1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (no
jurisdiction); Pactiv Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 449 F.3d 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(jurisdiction).
201 Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527
F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Micron Tech., Inc. v. MOSAID Tecks., Inc., 518 F.3d 897 (Fed. Cir. 2008), presents a
similar but distinguishable case because in Micron, the patentee sought to preclude
the non-licensee's suit for declaratory relief of noninfringement.
20. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 482 F.3d 1330 (non-licensee); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd.,
527 F.3d 1278 (patentee).
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(19%);21o in the three years after MedImmune, sub)ect matter jurisdiction
was found in 19 out of 49 contested cases (39%). 21
The increase in the finding of subject matter jurisdiction has largely
occurred in cases brought by non-licensees." Pre-Medlmmune, nonlicensees were granted subject matter jurisdiction only once out of nine
attempts (11%).213 Not unexpectedly, post-Medlmmune, non-licensees
were more successful; subject matter jurisdiction was found in 7 out of 19

attempts (37%).1

By contrast, patentees have seen almost the same success rate in
precluding subject matter jurisdiction for lack of a controversy. PreMedImmune, patentees sought to preclude declaratory relief for lack of
controversy 8 times out of 8 (100%),215 with the courts finding the
existence of a controversy only 2 times out of the 8 (25%).l

After

MedImmune there was an increase in the number of patentees seeking to
preclude a declaratory judgment in 19 instances out of 21 (90%);217
Infra notes 216, 220, 222.
Infra notes 212, 213, 217.
212 There is one case brought by a licensee,
Linzer Products Corp. v. Sekar, 499 F.
Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). In that case, the licensee sought and was granted
subject matter jurisdiction in part and denied in part.
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. FDA, 398 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2005).
" Document Generation Corp. v. AllMeds, Inc., No. 07-841-GPM, 2009 WL
2848997 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2009); Tesco Corp. v. Weatherford Int'l, Inc., No. H-082531, 2009 WL 497134 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2009); Alpharma, Inc. v. Purdue Pharm.
L.P., 634 F. Supp. 2d 626 (W.D. Va. 2009); Astec Am., Inc. v. Power-One, Inc., No.
6:07-cv-464, 2008 WL 1734833 (E.D. Tex. April 11, 2008); Highway Equip. Co., Inc. v.
Cives Corp., 476 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (N.D. Iowa 2007); WS Packaging Group, Inc. v.
Global Commerce Group, LLC, 505 F. Supp. 2d 561 (E.D. Wis. 2007);Judkins v. HT
Window Fashions Corp., 514 F. Supp. 2d 753 (W.D. Pa. 2007). Subject matter
jurisdiction was found in two instances where non-licensees sought to preclude:
PharmaNet, Inc. v. DataSci Ltd. Liability Co., No. 08-2965 (GEB), 2009 WL 396180
(D.N.J. Feb. 17, 2009); EchoStar Satellite LLC v. Finisar Corp., 515 F. Supp. 2d 447
(D. Del. 2007).
In one case initiated by a patentee against a non-licensee, the district court found
no subject matter jurisdiction. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Acceleron LLC, 601 F. Supp. 2d
581 (D. Del. 2009). The Federal Circuit, however, reversed because it found subject
matter jurisdiction. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Acceleron LLC, 587 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir.
2009). The numbers reported above reflect the district court's holding for the sake of
simplicity.
'5 Fairplay Elec. Cars LLC v. Textron Innovations, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 491 (D.
Del. 2006); Nutrasweet Co. v. Ajinomoto Co., 423 F. Supp. 2d 450 (D. Del. 2006);
Black & Decker Inc. v. Bosch Tool Corp., 371 F. Supp. 2d 965 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Neil
Bros. Ltd. v. World Wide Lines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 2d 340 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Teva
Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 301 F. Supp. 2d 819 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Mutual Pharm.
Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 88 (D.D.C. 2004); Institut Pasteur v. Simon, 332 F.
Supp. 2d 755 (E.D. Pa. 2004); DePalma v. Nike, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 2d 178 (N.D.N.Y.
2004).
21 The district courts found subject matter jurisdiction in: Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.,
301 F. Supp. 2d 819; Neil Bros. Ltd., 396 F. Supp. 2d 340.
217 BridgeLux, Inc. v. Cree, Inc., No. C 06-6495 PJH, 2007 WL 2022024 (N.D. Cal.
July 9, 2007) (In BridgeLux, the court split, finding subject matter jurisdiction for
some causes of action and denying it for others); Nat'l Presort, Inc. v. Bowe Bell &
210
211
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subject matter jurisdiction was found in 9 of the 19 cases (47%).28
Although patentees were less successful after MedImmune, given the
greater number of cases (8 versus 19), no final conclusions can be drawn,
nor is the increase, from 37.5% to 50% necessarily significant.
Conversely, where patentees have sought declaratory relief, the
numbers are so small it is impossible to draw any definitive conclusions.2 19
Before MedImmune, patentees sought, and were granted, subject matter
jurisdiction once.220 Similarly, after MedImmune, patentees sought subject
matter jurisdiction only once, which the court denied.2 2 ' But this case was
in the context of the ANDA regime, raising a final point.
In the context of the ANDA regime, the parties had mixed success
seeking declaratory relief before MedImmune. Before MedImmune, nonlicensees sought declaratory relief once within the ANDA regime and it
was granted; in two other instances, non-licensees were able to preclude
Howell Co., 663 F. Supp. 2d 505, 514 (N.D. Tex. 2009); Int'l Development Corp. v.
Richmond, No. 094595 (GEB), 2009 WL 3818141 (D.N.J. 2009); Hoffman-La Roche
Inc. v. Mylan Inc., No. 2:09-01692, 2009 WL 4796736 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 2009); Argonide
Corp. v. In-Tec Water Prods., LLC, No. 6:09-cv0852-Orl-28DAB, 2009 WL 4667398
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 2009); D2L Ltd. v. Blackboard, Inc., No. WDQ-09-1763, 2009 WL
4348806 (D. Md. Dec. 2, 2009); Cobra N. Am., LLC v. Cold Cut Sys. Svenska AB, No.
08-cv-00873-DME-CBS, 2009 WL 4506404 (D. Colo. Nov. 30, 2009); Ass'n for
Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, No. 09 Civ. 4515, 2009 WL 3614434 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2,
2009); Microsoft Corp. v. WebXchange Inc., C.A. No. 09-484-JJF, 2009 WL 3534845
(D. Del. Oct. 30, 2009); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Eisai Co., No. 08-2344 (GEB), 2009
WL 2905534 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009); Barnhardt Mfg. Co. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc.,
No. 3:08-cr-00617-W, 2009 WL 2498036 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 13, 2009); Vantage Trailers,
Inc. v. Beall Corp., No. H-06-3008, 2008 WL 304747 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2008), affd,
567 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 2009); Diamonds.net, LLC, v. Idex Online, Ltd., 590 F. Supp.
2d 593 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Delta T. Corp., No. 06-C-1187, 2007 WL
725327 (E.D. Wis. March 7, 2007); FieldTurf USA, Inc. v. Sports Constr. Group, LLC,
507 F. Supp. 2d. 801 (N.D. Ohio 2007); Janssen Pharmaceutica., N.V. v. Apotex, Inc.,
No. 06-cv-1020 (DMC), 2007 WL 3014702 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2007), affd, 540 F.3d 1353
(Fed. Cir. 2008); Pfizer, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Lab. Ltd., 525 F. Supp. 2d 680 (D. Del. 2007);
Cordance Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 340 (D. Del. 2007).
2" BridgeLux, Inc., 2007 WL 2022024 (In BridgeLux, the court split, finding
subject matter jurisdiction for some causes of action and denying it for others; for
simplicity, this case is not included in the results); Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 2009
WL 3614434; Int'l Dev. Corp., 2009 WL 3818141; CobraN. Am., LLC, 2009 WL 4506404;
D2L Ltd., 2009 WL 4348806; Argonide Corp., 2009 WL 4667398; Diamonds.net, LLC, 590
F. Supp. 2d 593; Rite-Hite Corp., 2007 WL 725327; FieldTurf USA, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d.
801; Cordance Corp., 521 F. Supp. 2d 340.
2" The small numbers preclude any meaningful assessment of how the changes
in preliminary injunction standards-making it more difficult for patentees to use
that remedy-have affected the strategy of patentees and licensees with respect to the
wisdom of seeking declaratory relief as an alternative remedy. See eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); David W. Opderbeck, Patent Damages
Reform and the Shape ofPatent Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 127, 131 (2009) (assessing impact of
recent patent cases, including eBay and Medlmmune).
o Takeda Chem. Indust., Ltd. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 394
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
221 SB Pharmco P.R., Inc. v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 552 F. Supp. 2d 500 (E.D. Pa. 2008)
(ANDA case).
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subject matter jurisdiction.22 But a non-licensee has yet to seek
declaratory relief under the ANDA regime since Med~mmune. In fact, for
the time period evaluated, there have been only four cases brought to the
223
district courts under the ANDA regime . In one case, subject matter
jurisdiction was sought, but the court declined to hear the action; in the
other three the patentee successfully sought to preclude subject matter
jurisdiction.
3. Conclusion
Both the Federal Circuit and the district courts appear to have
largely adhered to their previous patterns despite MedImmune. Perhaps
most notable is the fact that licensees, although never heavily involved in
declaratory judgment actions, have not yet appeared before the Federal
Circuit.22

Given that Med~mmune's facts surrounded the conduct of a

licensee, licensors may have simply avoided litigation through
negotiation or strategic decision-making. Nevertheless, it is intriguing
that of the cases following MedImmune (including cases returning to court
because of the MedImmune decision) the Federal Circuit has not
addressed even one action for declaratory relief brought by a licensee.
C.

MedImmune: An Assessment in Patent Litigation

Both SanDisk and Teva 2007 demonstrate a focus on the potential for
suit in the future, which constitutes a change from the previous focus on
the probability of a suit. In addition, courts appear to have begun with the
presumption of a controversy, as opposed to placing the burden on the
party seeking declaratory relief to make that showing. This shift in the
22
burden is consistent with one of the concerns justice Thomas raised . 5
This effect is not surprising, however, since the rationale employed in
Med~mmune lends itself to expansion: a non-repudiating party can
demonstrate a controversy absent any direct threat of litigation. Thus,
parties not in an agreement presumptively can be understood to have
adverse interests and controversy unless someone demonstrates
otherwise.
The potentially expansive effects of MedImmune have been
constrained, however, within the ambit of government regulated ANDA
Subject matter jurisdiction sought and granted: Teva Pharm., USA, Inc. v.
FDA, 398 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2005). Subject matter jurisdiction precluded:
Apotex, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 187 (S.D.NY. 2005); Glaxo Group Ltd. v.
Dr. Reddy's Lab., Ltd., 325 F. Supp. 2d 502 (D.N.J. 2004).
25Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Mylan Inc., No. 2:09-01692, 2009 WL 4796736
(D.N.J. Dec. 9, 2009); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Eisai Co., No. 08-2344 (GEB), 2009
WL 2905534 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009); Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.y. v. Apotex, Inc., No.
06-cv-1020 (DMC), 2007 WL 3014702 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2007), affd, 504 F.3d 1353
(Fed. Cir. 2008); SB Pharmco PEX, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 2d 500 (subject matter
jurisdiction sought and declined).
2'For the time period evaluated.
222

22

See supra notes 71-98.
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cases. 26The
ANDA creates clear procedural obligations that constrain a
patentee's conduct and options. Because of these constraints, courts may
feel more secure in establishing hurdles on a non-patentee seeking
declaratory relief. In effect, the ANDA provides the scope through which
to evaluate the relevant facts and circumstances.
In sum, the lower courts have recognized the lack of limiting factors
in the totality-of-circumstances test, but do not appear to have overly
stretched their reasoning to determine whether a controversy exists.
Further, the consistency in the outcomes of the Federal Circuit and
district courts underscores a constrained framework the courts have
adopted to prevent unrestrained growth.
D. MedImmune 's Impact Outside of Patent Litigation
Med~mmune has begun to seep into areas of the law outside of patent
litigation, which is appropriate given that the major effect of the Court's
ruling was to return declaratory relief in patent cases to the transsubstantive standard. Circuits that had relied on versions of the Federal
Circuit's reasonable apprehension of suit test in other contexts have
recognized that such precedent is now superseded. These courts have
interpreted Med~mmune as the Federal Circuit has. They agree that the
Supreme Court rejected the reasonable apprehension of imminent suit
227
test and lowered the bar for determining the existence of a controversy.
For instance, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals applied MedImmune
in a trademark case and overturned precedent that it had built upon the
Federal Circuit's reasonable apprehension of imminent suit test. In

Surefoot LC v. Sure Foot
228

Corp.,

both parties were manufacturers of

footwear.
Sure Foot Corp. had "repeatedly accused Surefoot LCI] of
infringing on its trademark, [and] occasionally threatened litigation ...
and filed five administrative petitions opposing Surefoot LC's attempts to
obtain trademark registrations. 2 291 In turn, Surefoot LC brought a
declaratory judgment action to ascertain "whether it was infringing on
2 0
Sure Foot Corp.'s [trademark] rights. 1
The district court held there was no controversy because Surefoot
LC lacked a reasonable apprehension of an imminent suit for trademark
infringement from Sure Foot Corp. The Tenth Circuit, however,
overturned the district court. The precedent relied upon by the district
court, the Circuit's own opinion in Cardtoons, L. C. v. Major League Baseball
2"See, eg., Merck & Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 418, 421 (D. Del. 2007)
(Parties submitting an ANDA initiate a paragraph IV certification process because
"[a] paragraph IV certification begins a process in which the question of whether the
listed patent is valid or will be infringed by the proposed generic product may be
answered by the courts prior to the expiration of the patent").
227 See, e.g., Revell v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., No. 06-402 (KSH), 2007 WL
2318390 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2007).
22' 531 F.3d 1236, 1238 (10th Cir. 2008).
"
Id.at 1238.
230 id.
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Players Ass'n, was no longer good law because of MedImmune. Cardtoons
had been developed in reliance "on an extensive body of case lawdeveloped primarily by the Federal Circuitli's]" reasonable apprehension
of suit test. 133 But "[i] n light of Med~mmune's direction . .. (Jardtoons [was]
no longer good law. 2 34 The court went on to apply MedImmune's broader,
new standard of totality of circumstances to find a controversy.23,
As the Tenth Circuit noted in Surefoot LC, MedImmune was not limited
to patent or even to intellectual property cases .2 The Supreme Court's
analysis in Med~mmune took a trans-substantive approach by relying on
two opinions where the underlying dispute lay in contracts of
insurance!"2 Furthermore, the Court in MedImmune never sought to limit
the holding to patent litigants. As the majority oginion stated, the
"petitioner has raised and preserved a contractcli.8
The Tenth Circuit's trans-substantive interpretation of MedImmune is
hardly unique. District courts based in other circuits have also applied
Med~mmune broadly, finding it applicable beyond the scope of patent
litigation. For example, in Geisha, LLC v. Tuccillo, Geisha, which alleged
that it held a trademark in a restaurant name and a stylized rendering of
the name, brought a declaratory judgment action against Tuccillo, who

also claimed a trademark in the name and a very similar rendering.23

As

had the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Surefoot LC, judge Rebecca
Pallmeyer of the Northern District of Illinois applied MedImmune and
240
precedent interpreting MedImmune.
MedImmune has also been applied outside of intellectual property
disputes. For example, in Dow Chemical Co. v. Reinhard, Dow Chemical
"'95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).
232

Surefoot LC, 531 F.3d at

1241-42.

23 id.
234 Id. at 1242.
211 Id. at 1244.
236

Id.

at 1243.

Id. ("[T]wo of the cases the Med~mmune Court cited in the process of rejecting
the reasonable -appre hension-of-suit test were insurance cases-themselves well
outside the intellectual property, much less patent, context. See MedImmune, 127 S. Ct.
at 744 n. I (citing Maryland Cas., 312 U.S. at 273. ...(insurance case), and Aetna, 300
U.S. at 239 ... (same)).").
23M MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 770 (2007).
2"Geisha, LLC v. Tuccillo, 525 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1004 (N.D. Ill. 2007). The
231

court noted the circumstances in Geisha were

converse to the typical declaratory

judgment action, but that "[iln Lang [v. Pac. Marine & Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) ], . .. the Federal Circuit addressed this type of situation and modified the
reasonable-apprehension-of-suit test to fit the reversed circumstances." Geisha, LLC,
525 F. Supp. 2d at 1012.
"0Despite applying Med~mmune, the court held that there was no subject matter
jurisdiction because the declaratory relief defendant's plans to open a restaurant with
the same name were not concrete enough to constitute a controversy. Geisha, LLC
525 F. Supp. 2d at 1013. See also Young v. Vannerson, 612 F. Supp. 2d 829, 846 (S.D.
Tex. 2009); AARP v. 200 Kelsey Assocs., LLC, No. 06 Civ. 81 (SCR), 2009 WL 47499
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2009) (applying MedImmune and Geisha in trademark infringement
disputes).
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filed for declaratory relief along with other claims to determine the
company's "obligation to Reinhard ... under ERISA to ... provide
notice of coverage under COBRA., 4 1 Citing Med~mmune, the district
court denied the request for declaratory judgment because "Dow
Chemical [had] not here identified any basis on which it face Ed] a
coercive dilemma. 2 4 2 Returning to the roots of declaratory relief
precedent, a district court in Colorado has applied MedImmune to an
insurance coverage dispute.24 Further affirming the trans-substantive
impact of MedImmune, judges of the Sixth Circuit have twice applied the
case in matters having nothing to do with intellectual property. 4
E. Medlmmune and the Discretion to Decline Actions for Declaratoiy Relief
At the end of his MedImmune opinion, justice Scalia went to some
length to remind lower courts that, even if there was subject matter
jurisdiction over the controversy, they retained "unique and substantial"

discretion to decide whether to declare the rights of the parties .2 45

If

courts wanted to continue to make it relatively difficult for declaratory
relief plaintiffs to initiate actions, i.e., to keep the discredited reasonable
apprehension of imminent suit test in another guise, one would expect
that they would seize the opportunity afforded by the discretionary
alternative.
However, courts do not seem to be clutching this option as often as
they could. Only twenty patent cases decided in the lower courts from
January 2007 to January 2010 have even cited the Supreme Court
opinions in both MedImmune and Wilton v. Seven Falls Co.,24 the lead
2 47
precedent on the discretion to decline an action for declaratory relief

241' Dow Chem. Co. v. Reinhard, No. 07-12012-BC, 2007 Wi. 5361218, at *9 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 20, 2007). Dow Chemical fired an executive vice-president (and another
employee) for engaging "in activity harmful to the interests of Dow Chemical" and
was engaged in protracted litigation with the defendants. Id. at *2.
212 Id. at *9.
242 Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marlow, 666 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (D. Colo. 2009).
244 Sch. Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 278 (6th

Cir. 2009) (en banc) (opinion of Sutton, J., for eight judges in equally divided court)
(applying MedImmune to case involving No Child Left Behind Act); Fieger v. Mich.
Sup. Ct., 553 F.3d 955 (6th Cir. 2009) (applying Med~mmune to an action filed by Dr.
Kevorkian's former attorney who was contesting censure for ethical violations for
comments he made about ajudicial panel).
245 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 776-77 (2007). See supra
text accompanying notes 68-70.
246 Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277
(1995) (holding that court had
discretion to determine whether or not to stay a declaratory judgment action during
parallel state court proceedings).
27See, e.g., AilMeds v. Document Generation Corp. (AIleds 11), No.
07-841-GPM,
2009 WL 3461896 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2009). AilMeds IIis related to Document Generation
v. Alleds, Inc., No. 07-841-GPM, 2009 WL 2848997 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2009). In
AIleds 1, however, the court addressed whether it should abstain. In its decision, the
court mentioned Wilton, just as it did in Document Generation v. AliMeds, Inc., but it
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In the three cases in the Federal Circuit, the court has used Wilton one
time to decline to exercise the discretion to proceed in a declarato 7
relief case and one time to explain why it was appropriate to proceed.
249
Of the seventeen cases in the district courts, Wilton was the basis of
declining jurisdiction three times, and was used three times to buttress
the decision to exercise jurisdiction.o
It is hard to know why courts have not used Wilton more often in
patent cases. Any time a court concluded that there was a controversy
under Medlmmune, it would make sense to go on to explain why it would
not decline to exercise its power, especially if the declaratory relief
defendant raised the issue as an alternative ground for dismissal. In cases
where the district court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction, it
would seem smart to avoid being reversed on appeal by discussing Wilton
as an alternative basis for the dismissal. The district court could easily
explain why, even if its analysis of the existence of a controversy under
MedImmune proved to be incorrect, it would nevertheless exercise its
discretion to dismiss under Wilton. The simple expedient of discussing
Wilton would discourage an appeal or make the chance of being affirmed
much greater because of the deference owed to the district court under
251
the abuse of discretion standard.

relied more substantively on Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491 (1942),
as the major precedent.
24
Micron Tech., Inc. v. MOSAID Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d 897 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
Cellco P'ship v. Broadcom Corp., 227 F. App'x 889 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Sony Elecs., Inc.
v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
249 Google, Inc. v. EMSAT Adv. Geo-Location Tech., LLC, No. 4:09CV1 243, 2010
WL 55685 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 4, 2010); Microsoft Corp. v. WebXchange Inc., No. 09-484JJF, 2009 WL 3534845 (D. Del. Oct. 30, 2009); Document Generation Corp., 2009 WL
2848997; Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Eisai Co., No. 08-2344 (GEB), 2009 WL 2905534,
(D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009); Warrior Sports, Inc. v. STX, LLC, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (E.D.
Mich. 2009); Duhn Oil Tool, Inc. v. Cooper Cameron Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 1090
(E.D. Cal. 2009); Photothera v. Oron, No. 07cv490-MMA(AJB), 2009 WL 734282
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2009); Dish Network Corp. v. TiVo, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 2d 719 (D.
Del. 2009); Ours Tech, Inc. v. Data Drive Thru, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d 830 (N.D. Cal.
2009); Berry Floor USA, Inc. v. Faus Group, Inc., No. 08-CV-0044, 2008 WL 4610313
(E.D. Wis. Oct. 15, 2008); Idaho Energy v. Harris Contracting Co., No. CV07-423-NEJL, 2008 WL 4498809 (D. Idaho Sept. 30, 2008); Delphi Corp. v. Automotive Tech.
Int'l, Inc., No. 08-CV-11048, 2008 WL 2941116, (E.D. Mich. July 25, 2008); 3D
Systems, Inc. v. Envisiontec, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 2d 799 (E.D. Mich. 2008); Priority
Healthcare Corp. v. AETNA, 590 F. Supp. 2d 663 (D. Del. 2008); Diamonds.net, LLC
v. Idex Online Ltd., 590 F. Supp. 2d 593 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Highway Equip. Co., Inc. v.
Cives Corp., 476 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (N.D. Iowa 2007); Crossbow Tech., Inc. v. YH
Tech., 531 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (N.D. Cal 2007).
250 In the remaining eleven cases, Wilton was cited, but was not used as a major
precedent.
2 See, e.g., Micron Tech., Inc., 518 F.3d at 905 (reversing district court because it
had applied the now-moribund Federal Circuit test, and because the lower court
neglected to evaluate the "convenience factors" of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) before
declining subject matter jurisdiction and thereby "effectively transferring the case to
anotherjurisdiction" where the parties were involved in related litigation).
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A good example of a missed opportunity to apply Wilton is Hewlett-

Packard Co. v. Acceleron,

LLC. 2 52

In Hewlett-Packard, District judge Sue

Robinson applied MedImmune and post-Medlmmune precedent from the
Federal Circuit and other district courts to a motion to dismiss an action
for declaratory relief in a classic patent case. After carefully reviewing the
relevant precedent, judge Robinson granted the dismissal requested by
the patentee, Acceleron. The trial judge concluded that she did not have
subject matter jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief involving
possible infringement by HP's Blade Server products .2 The case was a
close one under the totality-of-circumstances test, and the court went out
of its way to underscore the facts leading to its conclusion. For example,
the district court cautioned that its "holding should not be interpreted as
foreclosing jurisdiction in every case involving a carefully crafted
letter."2 54 In dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court
did not mention either Wilton or the discretion to decline to exercise
jurisdiction.
Chief judge Paul Michel, writing for the circuit panel on appeal,

reversed. After looking "objectively and in

totality, 2

55

the panel saw the

facts adding up a little differently. In the circuit court's view, once
Acceleron had taken affirmative steps constituting an implied assertion of
its rights against HP's Blade Server products, and HP disagreed, there
was sbject matter jurisdiction arising from a "definite and concrete"
dsue.5' The circuit court observed that it agreed with judge
Robinson's "careful opinion analyzing declaratory judgment jurisdiction
[that] there is no bright-line rule for distinguishing those cases that
satisl,5 the actual case-or-controversy requirement from those that do
not." i Nevertheless, due to Med~mmune, "[lolur jurisprudence must
consequently also evolve, and in this case the facts demonstrate adverse
2 58
legal interests that warrantjudicial resolution.
For present purposes, it is not necessary to resolve whether judge
Robinson or Chief judge Michel's panel opinion placed the facts of this
close case on the correct side of a non-existent bright line. Nor is it
important to analyze whether the appellate court gave appropriate
deference to the considered findings of the trial court. Nevertheless, it
seems reasonable to presume that the Federal Circuit would have had a
much harder time reversing "objectively and in totality" if the district
court spent a bit of time buttressing its conclusion with a careful analysis
under Wilton as to why it would not exercise its discretion to hear HP's
action even if it had subject matter jurisdiction under MedImmune.
15'
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Acceleron, LLC, 601 F. Supp. 2d 581 (D. Del. 2009),
rev'd, 587 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

Id. at 583, 589.
Id. at 589.
2"Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Acceleron, LLC, 587 F.3d at 1364.

251
254

256 id.
257 id.
25

id.
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In contrast to the missed opportunity represented by Hewlett-Packard,
one of the few examples of what should be the ordinary way to apply
Wilton is WarriorSports, Inc. v. STX, LLC.2. In a classic patent case, Warrior
Sports alleged that a competitor, STX, sold a model of 2lacrosse
gloves
that infringed on the plaintiffs patents for hockey gloves. '0As part of its
defense, STh filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration of
noninfringement and of the invalidity of Warrior Sports' patents.26 The
parties came to a partial settlement, in which Warrior Sports agreed not
to seek damages for any sales by STX prior to July 31, 2009 . 262
Warrior Sports sought ,dismissal of the entire action without
prejudice because of the partial settlement and because no one knew
what STX might choose to sell in the future.26 Despite the partial
settlement, STX contended that the district court still had jurisdiction
over its counterclaim regarding infringement and invalidity because of its
intent to sell gloves with similar or identical features afterJuly 31, 2009.
Writing in January 2009, judge David Lawson of the Eastern District of
Michigan dismissed the action without prejudice. The district court
explained that the present controversy was mooted by the settlement.21
Unlike in MedImmune, STh was under no compulsion to choose to pay
disputed royalties or face the risk of suit (at least through July 31, 2009).
The court concluded that the possibility that a suit might arise because of
the marketing choices STX might make after July 31, 2009, did not
render the potential controversy sufficiently ripe to support jurisdiction
under Article III of the U.S. Constitution or under the Declaratory
Judgment Act.26
The court went on to discuss Wilton, even though the parties had not
raised the matter. Given the settlement agreement, STX faced no risk of
litigation for its present conduct and did not have to give up any rights.
Any risk of suit STX faced "in the distant future rests within its immediate
control" 6 Even if the controversy in itsprsnstewaofufcit
immediacy to support jurisdiction, the court concluded that it would not
exercise its discretion to hear the action for declaratory relief at that

time.26
29Warrior

21
261

Sports, Inc. v. STX, LLC, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (E.D. Mich. 2009).

Id. at 1072.

262

id.
id.

261

Id. at 1072-73.

21Id.

at 1072.

The court pointed out that STX had not shown evidence of what its product
line would be after July 31, 2009, so there was no way to judge how similar the
products might be to Warrior Sports' patents. STX offered only ambiguous
statements of intent to sell products after the expiration of the time period. Id. at
1076-77.
26. Id. at 1077.
267 Id. For a similar example in the ANDA context,
see, e.g., Teva Pharm. USA,
Inc. v. Eisai Co., No. 08-2344 (GEB), 2009 WL 2905534 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009). In this
case, the district court wrote a lengthy opinion explaining why Teva had not
26
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Although consideration of Wilton can help to insulate a case from
268
reversal on appeal , it is not complete protection. The Federal Circuit
has been appropriately skeptical when the "discussion" of Wilton
consisted of merely a rote recital that the district court would decline to
exercise discretion.26 The Federal Circuit, has occasionally secondguessed the exercise of discretion, but with a remand for further
consideration by the district court.21
A good example of the Federal Circuit's thinking is presented in
Micron Technology, Inc. v. MOSAID Technologies, Inc. 7 Micron Technology
filed an action for declaratory relief against MOSAID in the Northern
District of California. MOSAID had pursued an aggressive litigation and
licensing strategy to enforce its circuit technology patents, including suits
filed against three of the four major competitors in the manufacture of
272
dynamic random access memory chips (DRAMs) . Given that it was one
of the four largest manufacturers, Micron assumed that it would be the
next company in the cross-hairs. It accordingly sought a declaration that
it had not infringed on fourteen patents held by MOSAID. The very next
day, MOSAID filed a patent infringement action against Micron and
273
some smaller manufacturers in the Eastern District of Texas.
Despite
this record, judge Fogel of the Northern District dismissed Micron's
action under the reasonable apprehension of suit test. He indicated that
he would exercise the discretion to dismiss even if there was subject

matter jurisdiction, which he thought was "tenuous at best.

27 4

presented a justiciable controversy under Article III. For good measure, the court
added a brief paragraph explaining why, even if there were subject matter
jurisdiction, it would choose not to hear the case under Wilton. Id. at *12-.13.
2'For
example, in Celico P'ship v. Broadcom Corp., 227 F. App'x 889 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (per curiam), the Federal Circuit concluded "that the district court [had]
erred as a matter of law in holding that no actual controversy existed between the
parties" under the intervening MedImmune test. Id. at 889. However, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the dismissal despite the application of the discarded standard. Id. at
890. The dismissal was warranted as an exercise of discretion because the district
court had also explained how maintaining the declaratory relief action would be an
inefficient use of judicial resources. Other proceedings were pending which raised
the same issues. Id.
"SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1383 (Fed. Cir.
2007). In SanDisk, the district court provided no explanation as to why it said that it
would exercise its discretion not to hear the claims even if it had jurisdiction. When
the Federal Circuit had to reverse because of the intervening Med~mmune decision, it
acidly stated, "we discern little basis for the district court's refusal to hear the case and
expect that in the absence of additional facts, the case will be entertained on the
merits on remand." Id.
270 E.g., Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271, 1289
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
271 518 F.3d 897 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
..
Id.at 899.
273 The Texas action concerned some of the patents in the California action as
well as some additional ones. Id. at 900.
274 Id. at 903.
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The Federal Circuit reversed. judge Randall Rader's opinion for the
panel discussed how the intervention of Med~mmune had changed the
jurisdictional analysis. Under the new totality-of-circumstances test, the
panel thought that MOSAID's saber-rattling gave Micron ample reason to
file for declaratory relief.2 5 judge Rader spent a considerable part of the
opinion on the question of discretion. The panel observed that the new
jurisdictional standard had eased the bar to filing actions for declaratory
relief. This enabled the patentees and would-be infringers to make a
"forum-seeking race to the courthouse , 7 as had happened in this case.
The circuit rejected the reasons judge Fogel had relied upon in
dismissing Micron's action. First, the court noted that judge Fogel's

belief that the case was "tenuous at

best

2 77

was based on the obsolete

reasonable apprehension of suit test. Second, the circuit rejected the
"broader" scope of the Texas action because that was easily manipulated
by simply adding another defendant or another claim. 78Finally,
the
circuit rejected the district court's reliance on the fact that neither forum
279
had invested much effort in their respective actions .
The circuit court observed that in cases "with competing forum
interests, the trial court" was obliged to apply the "'convenience factors'
found in a transfer analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) .,,280 By focusing on
these factors,'8 rather than any rule of thumb such as first to file, the
circuit hoped that the parties would be deterred from racing to forum
shop. Applying the convenience factors to the case at hand, the circuit
panel thought that the Northern District of California was a more
convenient forum than the "well-known patent forum" of the Eastern
282
District of Texas. Since it would be an abuse of discretion to transfer
the case to Texas under § 1404(a), a dismissal which effectively
283
transferred the case to that forum was equally an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 901.
Id. at 902.
277 Id. at 903.
''The court noted that the action in Texas was actually narrower in some
respects than the California action. Id.
29Id. at 903-04.
275
271

21

Id. at 902-03.

"The convenience and availability of witnesses, absence ofjurisdiction over all
necessary or desirable parties, possibility of consolidation with related litigation, or
considerations relating to the interest of justice must be evaluated to ensure the case
receives attention in the most appropriate forum." Id. at 904-05.
282 The strongest factor favoring the
forum was the fact that MOSAID, a
Canadian company, based its U.S. operations in the Northern District of California.
Id. at 905.
2" "A district court's discretion to decline jurisdiction is reviewed for an abuse of
that discretion .... An abuse of discretion occurs when: '(1) the court's decision was
clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful; (2) the decision was based on an
erroneous conclusion of law; (3) the court's findings were clearly erroneous; or
(4) the record contains no evidence upon which the court rationally could base its
decision.'" Id&(citing Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 929 F.2d 670, 673 (Fed.
Cir. 1991)).
2"'
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The Micron opinion provides fairly clear guidance for district courts
in the race to the courthouse scenario .2 8 4 Parties in the declaratory relief
action can use this opinion as a template for how to provide reasoned
arguments to the district courts in support of a decision to accept or
It is not difficult to do, and will provide
decline to hear the action .
more protection from reversal on abuse of discretion. 8
V. CONCLUSION
MedImmune removed nearly any formal limiting factors or constraints
28
to find the existence of a controversy in actions for declaratory relie. 1
In those instances where the courts have found limits, only the ANDA
regime appears to be a formal constraining force .28Furthermore, absent
the framework imposed hy federal regulations, there may be a small
trend toward 21a finding of controversy in sometimes attenuated
circumstances. 8
But the courts have not demonstrated a willingness to completely
abandon all boundaries when identifyring a controversy. Absent any firm
limiting principles, courts have instead maintained a narrow focus on the
totality-of-circumstances test. Thus, Med~mmune has been interpreted to
remove only a rigid definition of what must occur to demonstrate a

211 judge Fogel later applied Micron to deny a request to exercise the discretion
to dismiss a declaratory relief action in favor of pending litigation in the Eastern
District of Texas. judge Fogel applied the convenience factors as Micron instructed.
Acer, Inc. v. Tech. Props. Ltd., No. C 08-877JF (HRL), 2008 WVL 4661603 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 21, 2008).
"5~Another very good example of the careful exercise of discretion under Wilton
is contained in Google, Inc. v. EMSAT Advanced Ceo-Location Tech., LLC, No.
4:09CV1243, 2010 WL 55685 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 4, 2010). After finding that it had
subject matter jurisdiction to hear a patent dispute concerning Google Maps, the
district court nevertheless declined to hear the matter after analyzing the case under
the Sixth Circuit's five-factor test. Id. at *3-..
286 See, e.g., Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, Re-evaluatingDeclaratoryJudgmentjurisdiction
in Intellectual Property Disputes, 83 IND. L.J. 957 (2008); Paul J. LaVanway, Jr., Note,
Patent Licensing and Discretion:Reevaluating the DiscretionaryProng of Declaratoryjudgment
jurisdictionAfter MedImmune, 92 MiNN. L. REV. 1966 (2008) (discussing factors courts
should consider in exercising discretion in declaratory judgment actions). For
discussion of the courts' use of that discretion in other declaratory relief contexts, see
Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Holmes County, 343 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting
formulations from five other circuits). See also Gemini Ins. Co. v. Clever Const., Inc.,
No. 09-00290 DAE-BMK, 2009 WL 3378593, at *3 (D. Raw. Oct. 21, 2009) (applying
discretionary factors in context of absent necessary party); Grace M. Ceisel, The
Expanded Discretion of Lower Courts to Regulate Access to the Federal Courts After Wilton v.
Seven Falls Co.: Declaratoryjudgment Actions and Implications Far Beyond, 33 Hous. L.
REv. 393 (1996).
287 See supra notes 43-47.
21See, e.g., SB Pharmco P.R., Inc. v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 552 F. Supp. 2d 500 (E.D.

Pa. 2008).
289

See, e.g., Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271 (Fed.

Cir. 2007).
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controversy, i.e., the looming presence of imminent suit. In effect, the
courts have interpreted MedImmune as removing constraints on how a
controversy may arise, not the prerequisite that a controversy must exist.
As a result, there has been no torrent of declaratory relief actions, farfetched or otherwise.
The analysis presented here cannot entirely refute the concern
justice Thomas expressed, that the lower courts were given too much
discretion to render declaratory opinions in situations which were
actually too hypothetical. As justice Thomas noted, another issue still
exists in the shift of burden of showing a case or controversy from
declaratory relief plaintiffs to defendants. Consequently, managing the
application of MedImmune rests not in the imposition of new limiting
factors per se, but in assuring that declaratory relief plaintiffs shoulder
the burden to demonstrate the existence of a controversy in their cases.'9
Preserving the burden on the declaratory relief plaintiff may require
the courts to reintroduce some objective measurements. For example,
the Federal Circuit might be able to resurrect one part of the reasonable
apprehension test, in a revised form of the notion of imminence.
Although MedImmune rejected the reasonable apprehension of imminent
suit test, the Federal Circuit still might be able to limit actions for
291
declaratoryjudgments where time is not of the essence.
For instance, in Teva 2007, the Federal Circuit found that the four
therapeutic patents at-large might still be sued on. Implicit to the court's
findings, however, were the time limits imposed by the ANDA regulatory
process in which a claim must be filed. By applying a narrow reading of
Teva 2007-a declaratory relief action would be precluded if a plaintiff
were unable to provide an exact point in time at which a patent might be
"9 Another important means of managing the potential effect of Medfmmune is to
draft licensing agreements in light of the case. One list of possible techniques
includes: "contractually prohibiting the licensee from challenging patent validity,
terminating if the licensee files a challenge, increasing royalties if the licensee files a
challenge, requiring that the licensee pay the licensor's costs in the event of a
challenge, imposing venue limitations, or requiring pre-filing mediation or
arbitration." Lawrence K. Nodine, et al., Declaratory judgment jurisdiction and
Injunctions in Patent Cases After MedImmune and ellay, 948 PLI/PAT 599, 605 (2008),
For further discussion, see Toshihiro Kuwahara, Drafting Strategies for Licensing
Agreements After MedImmune Decision, 927 PLI/PAT 141 (2008); Liza Vertinsky,
Reconsidering Patent Licensing in the Aftermath of Medlmmune, 45 Hous. L. REv. 1609
(2009); M. Natalie Alfaro, Comment, Barring Validity Challenges Through No-Challenge
Clauses and Consent Judgments: MedImmune 's Revival of the Lear Progeny, 45 Hous. L.
Rrv. 1277 (2008); Stephanie Chu, Note, Operation Restoration: How Can Patent Holdeis
Protect Themnselves fromn MedImmune?. 2007 DuKE L. & TECH. Rrv. 008 (2007),
http://www.law.duke.edu/joumals/dlr/articles/pdf/2007DLTROO08.pdf.
2For example, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the imminence requirement
as part of the standing doctrine in another context: "Such 'some day' intentionswithout any description of concrete plans, or indeed any specification of when the
some day will he--do not support a finding of the 'actual or imminent' injury that
our cases require." Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1151 (2009)
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992)).
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challenged-the court might assure that a plaintifs litigation strategy
focuses on objective actions by the defendant that exerted a coercive
force. Further, the court might be able to extend this reasoning beyond
the ANDA regime under SanDisk, by focusing on the means through
which companies such as STMicroelectronics initiated contact, e.g., the
point in time that in-house counsel assumed the negotiating lead in lieu
of the engineering department. This requirement of specificity would:
(1) assist in constraining attenuated third-party threats; (2) allow the
lower courts to build on the proposition that at least one limiting factor
does in fact exist in the totality-of-circumstances test; and (3) provide
practitioners with a more predictable process through which to advise
clients on the best procedures to follow to prevent suit. These changes
would be consistent with the totality-of-circumstances test and still allow
licensees to sue for declaratory relief in appropriate circumstances. 9
A more powerful tool, however, may rest in the courts' ability to
dismiss actions for declaratory relief on discretionary grounds. Yet, it is
curious that the lower courts have not placed greater reliance on the
wide discretion they enjoy under Wilton 23to
dismiss an action at the
initial stage even if there is controversy, or to choose to deny declaratory

relief at a later

point.29

The Supreme Court has consistently struck a very

deferential stance on the ability of the lower courts to exercise their
discretion. As justice Scalia noted in remanding MedImmune, "[1w] e have
found it 'more consistent with the statute . .. to vest district courts with
discretion in the first instance, because facts bearing on the usefulness of
the declaratory judgment remedy, and the fitness of the case for
resolution, are peculiarly within their grasp."'
Declaratory relief
defendants, such as patentees, can make it easier for lower courts to

Declaratory relief defendants might find support for this approach in the
Supreme Court's new directive to district courts to demand more detail from all
292

plaintiffs if their complaints are challenged under Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. District courts have been informed that they have the power to
ensure that the facts pleaded are sufficient in detail and constitute plausible claims for
relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009). See, eg., Ass'n for Molecular
Pathology v. USPTO, No. 09 Civ. 4515, 2009 WL 3614434, at *28 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2,
2009); Capitol Specialty Ins. Corp. v. Whitaker, No. 09-cv-92-JPG, 2009 WL 2488275,
at *1-2 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2009) (both assessing actions for declaratory relief under

Iqbal); Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84

NoTRE DAME

L. Rov. 1919,

1930-35 (2009) (discussing potential impact of the new pleading requirement); see

also Symposium, PonderingIqbal, 14 LEwis & CLARK L. REv. 1 (2010).
2 Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 282 (1995).
2See Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 777 (2007) ("We
leave the equitable, prudential, and policy arguments in favor of such a discretionary
dismissal for the lower courts' consideration on remand. Similarly available for
consideration on remand are any merits-based arguments for denial of declaratory
relief.").
2'5 Id. at 776 (quoting Wilton, 515 U.S. at 289).
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exercise that discretion by presenting well-reasoned arguments for them
16
to do So.
Although the Supreme Court may not have stated any formal
limiting principles in Med~mmune, the decision demonstrates a similar
faith in the ability of the lower courts to continue to work through the
totality of the circumstances and to arrive at just conclusions in often
complicated matters. So long as the lower courts (especially the district
courts) show that the Supreme Court was correct to place faith in their
abilities, all should be well.
In sum, justice Thomas's fear of unbridled use of the totality-ofcircumstances test has not come to pass, at least not yet. Unless and until
the lower courts begin to demonstrate a greater willingness to grant
declaratory relief in attenuated circumstances than they have shown to
date, MedImmune's lack of limiting factors is of theoretical interest but is
not deeply problematic. Still, the shadow ofJustice Thomas's critique has
not been eliminated in full. The shift in burden to show a case or
controversy away from the party seeking declaratory relief is more of a
real concern. The Court should monitor whether the lower courts
continue to properly determine the existence of a controversy under the
totality-of-circumstances test and whether they apply the power of
discretion appropriately despite laboring without any express structural
guidelines in the patent context on either issue. But, for now, MedImmune
appears to have had the results desired by the Court majority. Parties can
more easily demonstrate the existence of a controversy in order to
question arguably coercive measures by patentees in court, and the lower
courts have adhered to a reasonable notion of when a sufficiently
concrete controversy does and does not exist. justice Thomas can rest
easier-for now.

2.6 It may be that some declaratory relief defendants are not providing the
district courts much basis to exercise that discretion. See, e.g., EchoStar Satellite LLC
v. Finisar Corp., 515 F. Supp. 2d 447, 452 (D. Del. 2007) (rejecting defendant's
argument that the court should exercise its discretion to dismiss because of the
"strong public policy considerations in favor of resolving disputes without the need
for litigation"). Some defendants are not raising the contention at all, leaving it to
happenstance whether the court decides to raise the issue sua sponte. See, e.g.,
Warrior Sports, Inc. v. STh, LLG, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1077 (E.D. Mich. 2009).
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